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ABSTRACT:  The forty-year debate over whether insider trading 
should be regulated has generally proceeded in all-or-nothing terms:  
Either all insider trading should be permitted (subject only to private 
restrictions imposed by issuers themselves), or none should.  This 
Article argues for an asymmetric insider trading policy under which 
insider trading that decreases the price of an overvalued stock is 
generally permitted, but insider trading that increases the price of an 
undervalued stock is generally prohibited.  Concluding that the net 
investor benefits of price-decreasing insider trading exceed those of 
price-enhancing insider trading, the Article argues that an
asymmetric insider trading regime likely represents the bargain that 
shareholders and corporate managers would strike if they were 
legally and practically able to negotiate an insider trading policy.  
Current insider trading doctrine would permit regulators to impose 
such an asymmetric insider trading policy as the default rule.  
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OVERVALUED EQUITY AND THE CASE FOR
AN ASYMMETRIC INSIDER TRADING REGIME
Thomas A. Lambert†
We do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire 
shares trade.  We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow 
range centered at intrinsic value…. [We] are bothered as 
much by significant overvaluation as significant under-
valuation.
—Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report, 1988
INTRODUCTION
Warren Buffett is an anomaly.  In expressing concern about the potential 
overvaluation of his company’s stock, the chairman and CEO of Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc. has distinguished himself from the vast majority of corporate 
managers, most of whom believe (or at least act as if they believe) that their 
highest end is to maximize their company’s stock price.1  But Mr. Buffett is 
right to be bothered by overvaluation.  Recent events in the financial world 
have revealed that overvaluation can be extremely damaging to a firm and 
its shareholders.2  This revelation calls for a rethinking of insider trading 
policy.
For four decades now, corporate law scholars have debated whether the 
government should prohibit insider trading,3 commonly defined as stock 
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1 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 5-6 
(2005) (“To my knowledge, with the exception of Warren Buffett (who hints at 
these forces in his 1988 letter to Berkshire shareholders) no leaders in the business 
or financial community have recognized the dangers of overvalued equity.”).
2 See id. See also infra notes 132 - 217 and accompanying text (discussing investor 
harms occasioned by equity overvaluation).
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 Earnest debate over the wisdom of an insider trading prohibition began some forty 
years ago with the publication of Henry Manne’s book, Insider Trading and the 
2trading on the basis of material, non-public information.4 Participants in this
long-running debate have generally assumed that trading that decreases a
stock’s price (“price-decreasing insider trading”) should be treated the same 
as trading that causes the price to rise (“price-enhancing insider trading”):  
Either both forms of trading should be regulated, or neither should.  This 
Article considers whether there is a principled basis for affording different 
legal treatment to the two species of insider trading.  It concludes that price-
decreasing insider trading should be treated less harshly than price-
enhancing insider trading.  
The reason for the proposed asymmetric treatment is that price-
decreasing insider trading provides significantly more value to investors
than price-enhancing insider trading.  Specifically, price-decreasing insider 
trading provides an effective means – perhaps the only cost-effective means5
– of combating the problem of overvalued equity, a problem whose 
Stock Market.  HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966).  The literature comprising the debate is far too voluminous to cite 
exhaustively.  For an excellent overview of the debate, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Insider Trading, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 777-94 (1999) 
(available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5650book.pdf).  For arguments defending 
the legal prohibition on insider trading, see, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any 
Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV.
1425 (1967).  For arguments in favor of deregulation of insider trading, see, e.g., 
Dennis Carlton & Daniel Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 857 (1983). 
4 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 519 (2002).
5
 Congress and securities regulators have recently sought to reduce the costs of 
equity overvaluation by enacting laws and adopting rules designed to prevent firms 
from becoming overvalued as a result of misinformation.  Most notably, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-24, 116 Stat. 745, which was adopted 
hastily in the panic atmosphere created by the implosion of Enron Corporation and a 
massive accounting fraud at WorldCom Inc., see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521, 
1549-68 (2005) (detailing Act’s political history and demonstrating lack of careful 
attention to costs and benefits of its reforms), imposes a number of restrictions 
designed to prevent overvaluation occasioned by accounting fraud.  See Larry E. 
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 11-18 (2002) (summarizing key 
provisions of Act).  Early indications are that the Act’s restrictions do not create 
investor benefits commensurate with their substantial costs.  See Larry E. Ribstein, 
Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, U. Ill. Law & Economics Research Paper No. 
LE05-016 (June 20, 2005) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=746884); Roberta 
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 
Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 04-37, 2004) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101) (reviewing empirical studies evaluating 
effectiveness of key Sarbanes-Oxley provisions).
3magnitude commentators are just beginning to appreciate.6  Overvalued 
equity, which occurs when a stock’s price becomes so high that it cannot be 
justified by expected future earnings,7 leads managers to take a number of 
value-destroying actions.  Corporate insiders, of course, are in the best 
position to know when the stock of their company is overvalued, and 
deregulation of price-decreasing insider trading would create a means by 
which they could signal the market that the stock price is too high, thereby 
avoiding the costs associated with overvalued equity. While deregulation of 
price-enhancing insider trading could similarly remedy the problem of 
undervalued equity, undervaluation causes fewer problems than 
overvaluation, and there are numerous other mechanisms for addressing that 
sort of mispricing.  Moreover, the potential investor losses associated with 
price-enhancing insider trading are higher than those associated with price-
decreasing trading.  Most corporations would therefore likely opt to permit 
(at least some) price-decreasing insider trading, while generally restricting 
price-enhancing insider trading. 
Of course, the signaling effect of price-decreasing insider trading, and
thus its salutary price effect, would be stronger if the trades were publicly 
announced when executed.  Accordingly, the Article concludes that most 
corporations would, if practically and legally able to do so, adopt an
asymmetric insider trading regime that would generally permit price-
decreasing insider trades as long as they were immediately announced to the 
public.  Public disclosure would have the added benefit of policing potential 
mismanagement by insiders, who might otherwise be tempted to delay the 
transmission of “bad news” or even to create such news in an attempt to 
generate trading profits.  Given that most investors and corporate managers 
would bargain for an insider trading policy generally permitting disclosed 
price-decreasing insider trading, while restricting price-enhancing insider 
trading, regulators should posit such a policy as the default that will govern 
in the absence of express contracting.  Current insider trading doctrine 
would permit them to do so.8
6 See generally Jensen, supra note 1. 
7 Id. at 5 (“Equity is overvalued when a firm’s stock price is higher than its 
underlying value. … By definition, an overvalued equity means the company will 
not be able to deliver – except by pure luck – the performance to justify its value.”).
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 While current insider trading doctrine would likely permit corporations to adopt 
policies liberalizing price-decreasing insider trading, corporations have not done so, 
most likely because regulators have not expressly promised them (and their 
insiders) immunity.  The SEC has a long history of seeking to expand the insider 
trading prohibition.  See generally Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 583-86 (discussing 
regulators’ zeal to expand insider trading prohibition beyond limits of enabling 
statute).  While (as argued in Part III) a corporation legally could authorize price-
4The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I briefly summarizes the long-
running policy debate over insider trading.  Part II describes the problem of 
overvalued equity, explains why price-decreasing insider trading will create 
greater investor benefits and impose lower investor costs than price-
enhancing insider trading, and describes the sort of asymmetric insider 
trading policy most corporations would adopt if expressly permitted to do 
so.  Part III, then, argues that regulators could approve this sort of
asymmetric insider trading regime under current law, even if the law is more 
hostile to insider trading than some advocates of insider trading deregulation 
assume.
I. Summary of the Insider Trading Debate 
The federal insider trading prohibition co-exists somewhat uneasily with 
the rest of the securities laws.  Whereas the general aim of most of the 
securities laws is to ensure the accurate pricing of securities by requiring 
dissemination to the market of information regarding the true value of 
securities, the insider trading prohibition explicitly prohibits certain types of 
trading on the basis of material, non-public information, thereby preventing 
such trades from informing the market regarding the true value of the 
securities at issue.9  The result is a schizophrenic regulatory regime in which 
certain value-revealing disclosures are mandated, but certain value-revealing 
trades are forbidden.  Such regulatory schizophrenia may make sense if 
there are harms associated with value-revealing insider trading, and, of 
course, proponents of the insider trading ban insist that there are.  Thus, a 
debate has raged for the last forty years regarding whether there truly are 
harms associated with insider trading and, if so, whether they eclipse the 
harms created by the insider trading ban.  Because an understanding of the 
case for an asymmetric insider trading regime requires a working 
understanding of the broader policy debate over the insider trading ban, I 
begin with a brief summary of the debate.10
Defenders of the ban on insider trading insist that it is fundamentally 
unfair for some traders to have an informational advantage over others, 
particularly when the advantaged traders are corporate insiders who are 
decreasing insider trading, if it did so, it would almost certainly face a lawsuit by 
zealous regulators.
9 See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 605 (“The basic function of a securities fraud 
regime is to ensure timely disclosure of accurate information to investors.  Yet, it 
seems indisputable that the insider trading prohibition does not lead to increased 
disclosure.”). 
10
 Because excellent and detailed summaries of the debate exist elsewhere, my 
summary is somewhat cursory.  For additional detail, see Bainbridge, supra note 3, 
at 777-94; Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 583-607.
5supposed to be acting as agents for those who lack the informational 
advantage.11  Ban defenders also contend that insider trading causes 
efficiency losses by (1) discouraging investment in the apparently rigged 
stock market, thereby reducing the liquidity of capital markets;12
(2) encouraging insiders to delay disclosures13 and to make management 
decisions that increase share price volatility but do not maximize firm 
value;14 and (3) increasing the “bid-ask” spread of stock specialists, who 
systematically lose on trades with insiders (whom they cannot identify ex 
ante) and will thus tend to “insure” against such losses by charging a small 
premium on each trade.15  Finally, some defenders of the ban assert that it is 
11 See, e.g., Schotland, supra note 3,  at 1439 (“Even if we found that unfettered 
insider trading would bring an economic gain, we might still forego that gain in 
order to secure a stock market and intracorporate relationships that satisfy such 
noneconomic goals as fairness, just rewards and integrity.”).  Other sources 
articulating versions of this fairness argument are cited in note 40, infra.
12 See Jeffrey M. Laderman et al., The Epidemic of Insider Trading, BUS. WK., 
April 29, 1995, at 78 (quoting SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as stating, “If the 
investor thinks he’s not getting a fair shake, he’s not going to invest, and that’s 
going to hurt capital markets in the long run.”); Lawrence M. Ausubel, Insider 
Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1022, 1022-23 
(1990) (asserting that insider trading deters potential investors from securities 
markets, as outsiders want to avoid dilution of their investment returns); Louis Loss, 
The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate “Insiders” in the 
United States, 33 MOD. L. REV. 34, 36 (1970) (arguing that insider trading 
constitutes a “grievous insult to the market in the sense that the very preservation of 
any capital market depends on liquidity, which rests in turn on the investor’s 
confidence that current quotations accurately reflect the objective value of his 
investment”).
13 See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency 
of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054-55 (1982) (arguing that, if 
insider trading were permitted, “subordinates would stall the upward flow of critical 
information to maximize their opportunities for financial gain,” resulting in an 
“impair[ment] [of] corporate decision-making at all hierarchical levels”).
14 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets:  Insider Trading and the Law of 
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982) (noting that if insider trading is 
permitted “an insider can profit from a decrease in the firm’s stock price as well as 
in increase; the temptation of profit might actually encourage an insider to act 
against the corporation’s interest”); Morris Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. 
REV. 470, 489-90 (1969); Schotland, supra note 3, at 1451.
15 Jack L. Treynor, Securities Law and Public Policy, 50 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 10, 10 
(1994) (“[Informed] trades can damage the dealer, perhaps fatally. That’s a valid 
reason for discouraging trading on so-called ‘inside’ information, quite apart from 
whether such trading entails misappropriation of corporate property or wire 
fraud.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, N.Y. L.J., July 
31, 1997, at 5 (“[T]he more that the law successfully prohibits the use of non-public 
6justified as a means of protecting the corporation’s property rights in 
valuable information regarding firm prospects.16
Proponents of the deregulation of insider trading discount these 
arguments and assert that insider trading can be beneficial on the whole and 
ought to be limited, if at all, only by corporations themselves via contract.17
With respect to the fairness argument, deregulation proponents retort that 
insider trading cannot be “unfair” to investors if they know in advance that it 
might occur and nonetheless choose to engage in the purportedly unfair 
trades.18  Moreover, deregulation proponents assert, the purported efficiency 
losses occasioned by insider trading are overblown.  There is little evidence, 
they say, that insider trading reduces liquidity by discouraging individuals 
from investing in the stock market,19 and it might actually increase such 
liquidity by providing benefits to investors in equities.20  With respect to the 
claim that insider trading creates incentives for delayed disclosures and 
value-reducing management, advocates of deregulation claim that such 
mismanagement is unlikely for several reasons.  First, managers face 
reputational constraints that will discourage such misbehavior.21  In 
addition, managers, who generally work in teams, cannot engage in value-
information, the more that the market maker can (and will be forced by competitive 
pressure to) narrow the bid-ask spread.”); Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, 
Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. FIN. 1457 (1983); Lawrence R. 
Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market 
with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985).
16 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 598-607.
17 See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3. 
18
 Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 
J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 807-09 (1980) (observing that if the existence of insider 
trading is known, outsiders will not be disadvantaged because the price they pay 
will reflect the risk of insider trading); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, 
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. 
CT. REV. 309, 323-30 (discussing and refuting fairness arguments).
19 See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 880 n. 76 (“[T]he notion that 
exchanges are harmed by insider trading is hard to square with the following facts: 
(1) the stock market was successful pre-1933 (before insider trading laws); (2) the 
stock market was successful pre-1960’s (before judicial extension of insider trading 
laws); (3) the stock market is currently successful despite the existence of legal and 
perhaps illegal insider trading.”).
20 Cf. id. at 881 (“Compensating managers [by permitting insider trading] increases 
the size of the pie, and thus outsiders as well as insiders profit from the incentives 
managers are given to increase the value of the firm.”).
21 See id. at 874 (noting that a manager will be motivated, at least in part, by “his 
long run interest in his human capital”).
7destroying mismanagement without persuading their colleagues to go along 
with the strategy, and any particular employee’s ability to engage in 
mismanagement will therefore be constrained by her colleagues’ attempts to 
maximize firm value or to gain personally by exposing proposed 
mismanagement.22  With respect to the argument that insider trading raises 
the cost of trading securities by increasing the bid-ask spread, proponents of 
deregulation point to empirical evidence discounting this purported effect of 
insider trading.23  Finally, deregulation proponents assert that, even if 
material non-public information is worthy of property protection, the 
property right need not be a non-transferable interest granted to the 
corporation; efficiency considerations may call for the right to be 
transferable and/or initially allocated to a different party (e.g., to insiders).24
In addition to rebutting the arguments for regulation, proponents of 
deregulation have offered affirmative arguments for liberalizing insider 
trading.  First, they maintain that insider trading should generally be 
permitted because it increases stock market efficiency (i.e., the degree to 
which stock prices reflect true value), which helps guarantee efficient 
resource allocation.25  Corporate insiders, after all, generally know more 
22 See id. at 873-74 (observing that “[m]anagers often work in teams and thus must 
first persuade one another that the firm should undertake a particular strategy” and 
that “the ability of any one manager to pursue bad opportunities will be constrained 
because other managers and employees will attempt to maximize the firm’s value”). 
23 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical 
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83 (2004) 
(surveying empirical evidence regarding insider trading’s effect on bid-ask spread 
and liquidity).  
24 See Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the 
Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 32 (1984) (defending use of 
insider trading law to protect rights to information but arguing that “property 
owners” – i.e., the corporations to whom the right to inside information is allocated 
– should be “permitted to contract as to the use of the information they own.”);  
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 878 (noting that contention that inside 
information is property “does not address the key question of why the firm and not 
the managers always should be allocated the property right in information”); 
Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 331 (approving property rights approach but noting 
that “insider trading should be permitted to the extent the firm that created the 
information desires (or tolerates) such trading.  The firm extracts value through 
exploiting the knowledge itself or reducing the salary of those who exploit it.”). 
25
 Although there is some disagreement concerning the extent and timeliness of the 
price effect occasioned by insider trading, there is near consensus among 
economists that insider trading pushes the price of a stock in the right direction.  
Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did 
Not Bark, ICER Working Paper No. 7-2005 at 4 (March 2005) (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=679662).  For empirical data demonstrating that insider 
8about their company’s prospects than anyone else.  When they purchase or 
sell their own company’s stock, thus betting their own money that the 
company is mispriced, they convey valuable information to the marketplace.  
Assuming their trades somehow become public, other rational investors will 
likely follow their lead, which will cause stock prices to reflect more 
accurately the underlying value of the firm.26  More efficient stock prices, 
then, will lead to a more efficient allocation of productive resources 
throughout the economy.27
Deregulation advocates further maintain that corporations ought to be 
allowed to adopt liberal insider trading policies because permitting insider 
trading could be an efficient form of managerial compensation.28  The 
argument here is that competition in the managerial labor and capital 
markets will lead corporations to adopt efficient insider trading policies.29
trading results in rapid incorporation of the impact of nonpublic information into 
market price, see Ji-Chai Lin & Michael S. Rozeff, The Speed of Adjustment of 
Prices to Private Information:  Empirical Tests, 18 J. FIN. RES. 143 (1995); Lisa K. 
Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661 
(1992).  For data from laboratory experiments suggesting that inside information is 
rapidly assimilated into market price, even when very few insiders participate in the 
market, see Martin Barner, et al., On the Microstructure of Price Determination and 
Information Aggregation with Sequential and Asymmetric Information Arrival in an 
Experimental Asset Market, 1 ANNALS FIN. 1 (2005); Daniel Friedman, et al., The 
Informational Efficiency of Experimental Asset Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 349 
(1982).  For theory supporting a rapid assimilation view, see Charles R. Plott & 
Shyam Sunder, Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider 
Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models, 90 J. POL. ECON.
663 (1982) (demonstrating using simulation techniques that markets adjust very 
rapidly to inside information).  For arguments that the price effect is less extent and 
rapid, see Sugato Chakravarty & John J. McConnell, Does Insider Trading Really 
Move Stock Prices?, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 191 (1999) (presenting 
data suggesting that informed trading by insiders has the same price affect as 
uninformed trading by outsiders); James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: 
A Critical Response to the “Chicago School”, 1986 DUKE L. J. 628, 646 (asserting 
that insider trading is a noisy device for communicating stock value).  For the 
outlier view that insider trading does not push stock prices in the right direction, see 
Vernon L. Smith, et al., Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in 
Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1119 (1988).
26 See infra notes 261 - 272 and accompanying text (discussing how insider trades 
lead to more efficient securities prices).
27 See infra notes 121 - 123 and accompanying text (discussing allocative 
inefficiencies occasioned by inaccurate securities prices).
28 See, e.g., Manne, supra note 3, at 116-19; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 869-
71.
29
 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-63.
9On the one hand, the market for managerial labor may reward corporations 
with liberal insider trading policies, for the right to make money through 
insider trading is valuable to potential managers.  On the other hand, capital 
market pressures will prevent corporations from adopting insider trading 
policies that are, on balance, harmful to investors.  Because granting 
managers the right to engage in insider trading lowers their salary 
requirements and creates an incentive for them to create “good news” for the 
corporation, the capital markets might reward firms with liberal insider 
trading policies.30  To the extent insider trading causes investor harm in 
excess of these benefits, however, it will be disfavored by investors, who 
will price the firm’s securities accordingly.  Thus, deregulation advocates 
maintain that the interaction of the labor and capital markets will assure that 
firms will adopt insider trading policies that are, on the whole, value-
maximizing.31
Professor Manne, perhaps the founder of the deregulatory camp,32 has 
recently articulated what he characterizes as a third affirmative argument for 
deregulation of insider trading: He asserts that insider trading lowers the 
cost of managerial decisionmaking by providing managers with valuable 
information that they could not otherwise cost-effectively obtain.33  Drawing 
on F. A. Hayek’s famous observation that the chief problem facing 
managers charged with resource allocation decisions is the fact that time-
and space-specific information is widely distributed,34 Professor Manne 
contends that corporate managers similarly face informational constraints.  
Just as Hayek saw the price mechanism as the primary solution to the 
problem of resource allocation generally,35 Professor Manne maintains that 
the price information generated by insider trading can similarly guide 
30 But see Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 332 (arguing that the right to engage in 
insider trading is an inefficient compensation mechanism not likely to be selected 
by corporations).
31
 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-66.
32 See supra note 3; see also Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required 
Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION:  
THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21 (1974); Henry G. 
Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970). 
33 See Manne, supra note 25, at 14-16.  Professor Manne contends that the 
managerial benefits created by insider trading explain why investors and managers 
neither adopted contractual insider trading restrictions nor called for regulation of 
insider trading prior to the 1960s, when the SEC began regulating the practice in 
earnest.  Id. at 19.
34
 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 
(1945).
35 Id. at 526.
10
corporate managers in making decisions about how to allocate firm 
resources.36
Not surprisingly, the affirmative case for liberalizing insider trading has 
not gone unchallenged.  With regard to the argument that insider trading 
leads to more efficient securities prices, ban proponents retort that trading 
by insiders conveys information only to the extent it is revealed, and even 
then the message it conveys is “noisy” or ambiguous, given that insiders 
may trade for a variety of reasons, many of which are unrelated to their 
possession of inside information.37  Ban defenders further maintain that 
insider trading is an inefficient, clumsy, and possibly perverse compensation 
mechanism.38  With regard to Professor Manne’s novel “managerial 
benefits” argument, ban defenders will likely respond with a version of their 
argument that insider trading is a noisy signaling device.39  After all, the fact 
that the market value of the entire firm is rising or falling would not seem to 
36
 Manne, supra note 25, at 14-21.  Manne’s notion that insider trading creates 
“prices” that guide firm managers is innovative.  Conventional economic theory has 
drawn a distinction between the market, in which resources are allocated in a 
decentralized fashion according to the price mechanism, and the firm, in which 
resources are allocated via managerial fiat without reference to prices (which 
generally do not exist within the firm).  See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 389 (1937) (arguing that “the distinguishing mark of the 
firm is the suppression of the price mechanism”).  Professor Manne suggests that 
insider trading may generate effective “prices” to guide resource allocation within
firms.
37 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakmen, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 574 (1984).
38 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 591-92 (criticizing insider trading as 
compensation mechanism because (1) insider’s compensation would be determined, 
in part, by his wealth; (2) the right to trade could not be limited to the insiders who 
created value-enhancing information; (3) “[a]llowing managers to profit from inside 
trading reduces the penalties associated with a project’s failure”; and (4) the value 
of the compensation is contingent and difficult to measure in advance and thus 
would be less desirable to managers); Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 332. 
39 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  Indeed, it would be proper for ban 
proponents to reiterate their “noisy signal” argument here, for Professor Manne’s 
managerial benefits argument is ultimately a version of the “traditional” argument 
that insider trading enhances allocative efficiency by increasing the efficiency of 
stock prices.  Whereas the traditional argument focused on investors’ allocation of 
capital, Professor Manne’s latest argument focuses on managers’ allocation of 
corporate resources.  But, of course, managers making decisions about how to 
allocate corporate resources are ultimately acting as “investors,” and the role insider 
trading plays in guiding managers is similar to that which it plays in guiding 
individual investors.
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convey much helpful information to a manager attempting to make a narrow 
management decision about one particular aspect of firm operations.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the well-worn insider trading debate 
is its starkness:  Assuming that insider trading must be treated as a whole, 
ban defenders and opponents have argued over liberalization in all-or-
nothing terms.  They have not considered whether some species of insider 
trading should be treated differently than others.  Part II of this Article 
argues that price-decreasing insider trading (“PDIT”), which consists of 
trading by insiders on the basis negative non-public information, provides 
greater net benefits to investors than price-enhancing insider trading 
(“PEIT”), which consists of trading by insiders on the basis of positive non-
public information.  Accordingly, the law should treat PDIT (i.e., insider 
sales, short sales, or purchases of put options) less harshly than PEIT (i.e.,
insider purchases of stock or call options).
II. The Case for Asymmetric Treatment of Price-Increasing 
and Price-Decreasing Insider Trading
The argument presented herein posits efficiency as the touchstone.40  In 
other words, it starts with the assumption that whether insider trading should 
40
 This is controversial.  See Benjamin Alarie, Dividend Entitlements and 
Intermediate Default Rules, 9 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 135, 137 (2004) (recognizing 
disagreement over ultimate criteria).  While most scholars considering whether 
insider trading should be deregulated have taken efficiency as the determinative 
criterion, see, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, 
AND POLICY (1991); Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal 
and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35 (1986); Carlton & Fischel, supra 
note 3; Easterbrook, supra note 18; David D. Haddock, Insider Trading: Academic 
Hostility and SEC Acquiescence: Henry Manne’s Insider Trading, 50 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 313 (1999); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasean Model of 
Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986); Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and 
Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123 (1998); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider 
Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 
(1980); Robert B. Thompson, Insider Trading, Investor Harm, and Executive 
Compensation, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 291 (1999), many others have focused on 
various philosophical formulations of fairness, see, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Ethics of 
Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 727 (1988); Ian B. Lee, Fairness and 
Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 119 (2002); Saul Levmore, Securities 
and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982); 
Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal, 
Economic, and Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 223 (1992); Kim 
Lane Scheppele, “It’s Just Not Right”: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1993); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principles in 
the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 (1999).  Because a liberalized 
insider trading policy would not seem “unfair” if investors knew in advance that 
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be deregulated depends on whether the benefits of permitting such trading 
(or, more accurately, of letting issuers decide for themselves whether or not 
to do so) exceed the costs of doing so.  Accordingly, the case for 
asymmetric treatment of PEIT and PDIT is structured around consideration 
of the relative costs and benefits of the two species of insider trading.
Subpart A compares the benefits of PEIT and PDIT by focusing on the 
relative costs of undervalued and overvalued equity.  Observing that equity 
overvaluation is more costly to investors than equity undervaluation, 
Subpart A concludes that PDIT provides greater benefit to investors, and to 
society in general, than PEIT.  Subpart B, then, compares the costs of PEIT 
and PDIT, concluding that the former imposes greater costs on investors
than the latter.  Subpart C argues that a policy permitting PDIT while 
banning PEIT is likely the majoritarian default rule—i.e., the approach most 
corporate managers and investors would negotiate were they able to do so.
A. Greater Benefits From Price-Decreasing Insider Trading
Somewhat curiously, legal scholars have paid little attention to the 
difference between stock overvaluation and undervaluation.41  Professor 
Marcel Kahan, for example, ignored the distinction in setting forth a 
somewhat elaborate and otherwise exhaustive taxonomy of stock price 
inaccuracies.42   Acknowledging that stock prices can exhibit different types 
of inaccuracy and that securities policy should distinguish between these 
inaccuracies, Professor Kahan classified inaccuracies in terms of cause 
(what caused the pricing inaccuracy?),43 manifestation (how did the 
such trading might occur and nonetheless chose to purchase or sell the stock at 
issue, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, this Article focuses on efficiency 
considerations.   
41
 A share of common stock entitles its holder to a pro-rata share of the 
corporation’s “free cash flow,” or cash flow that is not needed for current or future 
operations.  Accordingly, the true value of a stock is the present value of the future 
payments the shareholder expects to receive, discounted for non-diversifiable risk 
(i.e., risk that cannot be eliminated by holding a diversified portfolio of stocks).  See 
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
72 (5th ed. 1996); Merritt B. Fox, et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic 
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 345 (2003) (defining a 
share of stock’s “actual value” at any point in time as “the aggregate future stream 
of income—dividends and other distributions—paid out from then on to whoever 
holds the share over the lifetime of the firm (discounted to present value).”).  A 
stock is overvalued if its market price is higher than this value and undervalued if 
this value exceeds the stock’s market price.
42 See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock 
Prices, 41 DUKE L. J. 977, 988 (1992).
43 Id. at 988.
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mispricing qualitatively manifest itself?),44 and scope (what was the 
magnitude of the mispricing?).45  Nowhere in his helpful and complex 
taxonomy did Professor Kahan consider the relevance of direction – i.e., 
whether the price was inaccurately great or inaccurately small.  Instead, he 
apparently assumed that overvaluation by a certain degree is equivalent, in 
terms of effect, to undervaluation by that same degree.  Similarly, Professor 
Lynn Stout’s work down-playing the costs of stock price inaccuracy has 
assumed that overly high stock prices create essentially the same problems 
as stock prices that are too low.46
This assumption is wrong.  As explained below stock overvaluation
tends to cause greater investor harm than undervaluation. Accordingly, 
insider trading that reduces the price of overvalued equity will provide 
greater investor benefits than insider trading that increases the price of 
undervalued equity.  The following discussion explains why equity 
overvaluation is more likely to occur and persist,47 is more difficult to 
correct,48 and is likely to cause greater investor harm49 than equity 
undervaluation.
1. Overvaluation Is More Likely to Occur and Persist than 
Undervaluation.
Stock prices may deviate from fundamental value for several reasons.50
First, prices may be inaccurate because of non-public information.  Given 
that stock prices ultimately reflect expected future cash flows,51 and traders’
expectations are based on publicly available information, the concealment or 
non-disclosure of material information regarding a company’s future 
prospects may result in an inaccurate stock price.52  So, for example, if a 
44 Id. at 994.
45 Id. at 999.
46
 Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of 
Stock Market Pricing and Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 640-43 (1988) 
(focusing on efficient capital allocation as primary social benefit of accurate stock 
prices and drawing no distinction between overvaluation and undervaluation).
47 Infra notes 50-87, 94-120 and accompanying text.
48 Infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
49 Infra notes 121-217 and accompanying text.
50
 Kahan, supra note 42, at 988 (cataloguing reasons stock prices may deviate from 
fundamental values).
51 See supra note 41.
52
 Kahan, supra note 42, at 988.  Even adherents of the semi-strong version of the 
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis admit that concealment or non-disclosure of 
material information may result in stock prices that fail to reflect the true value of 
14
mining company has discovered a major ore strike but no one outside the 
company knows about the discovery, the stock price of the company, failing 
to incorporate the news that the company stands to make more money in the 
future because of the ore discovery, will be inaccurately low.53  Stock price 
inaccuracies may also result from investor misassessment of public 
information (i.e., from investors improperly weighing public information in 
determining their willingness to pay for the stock at issue);54 from 
speculative trading (i.e., from investors determining willingness-to-pay not 
by their beliefs about the intrinsic value of the stock but by their beliefs 
about what others will be willing to pay for the stock in the future);55 or 
the underlying securities.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, 
Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 418 (2004) (noting 
that “material nonpublic information” is “not included in the ‘semi-strong’ form of 
efficiency”). 
53 Cf. Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 
1968).
54
 Kahan, supra note 42, at 989 (“[A] select group of especially skillful investors 
may arrive at an assessment of fundamental stock value that is consistently more 
precise than the share price determined by the stock market.”)  Note that while this 
is a possibility, aggregate assessments of worth are normally more accurate than 
individual assessments of value.  See Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of 
Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 
(1976); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 3-39 (2004) (presenting an 
accessible and highly entertaining assertion of this position).
55
 Kahan, supra note 42, at 990-92.  John Maynard Keynes famously articulated this 
point in his amusing beauty contest analogy:
[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six 
prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being 
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds 
to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that 
each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself 
finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the 
fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the 
problem from the same point of view.  It is not a case of choosing 
those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, 
nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the 
prettiest.  We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the 
average opinion to be.  And there are some, I believe, who 
practice the fourth, fifth, and higher degrees.
JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
156 (MacMillan & Co. 1947) (1936).
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from liquidity crunches (i.e., the price-affecting surpluses and shortages that 
occur when investors engage in speculative trading).56
For each of these sources of inaccuracy, information is the antidote.  
This point should be obvious for inaccuracies caused by non-public 
information, but it is true for the other sources of inaccuracy as well.
Misassessment errors can be corrected if those with superior assessment 
skills – i.e., securities analysts and corporate managers, who know the 
business best – educate the investing public as to why the stock at issue is 
mispriced.  Periods of speculative trading, which tend to be rather short-
lived in any event, can be halted if managers or analysts inform enough 
traders that the speculation-driven stock price is diverting from true value 
and is likely to return to a more accurate level.  And, of course, mispricing 
created by a liquidity crunch will be corrected by an information campaign 
that halts the speculative trading causing the liquidity crunch. 
Given that a lack of information is behind practically all instances of 
stock mispricing, it should not be at all surprising that the bulk of securities 
mispricing occurs in the direction of overvaluation rather than 
undervaluation.57 Equity overvaluation is more likely to occur and persist 
than undervaluation because the entities most likely to provide the 
information that would correct mispricing – i.e., corporate managers and 
stock analysts – are much more likely to do so, and have better tools for 
doing so, when the mispricing is in the negative direction.
a. Management Is Less Likely to Correct 
Overvaluation.
While there are persuasive arguments in favor of the view that corporate 
managers, seeking to protect their reputations for trustworthiness, will have 
a tendency toward candor,58 there are numerous reasons to believe that 
56
 Kahan, supra note 42, at 992-93.
57 See Mark T. Finn, Russell J. Fuller & John L. Kling, Equity Mispricing: It’s 
Mostly on the Short Side, 55-6 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 117 (1999).  Utilizing data on 
price earnings ratios and the level of firm repurchases and issuances of new stock, 
the authors identified two portfolios of mispriced stocks, one undervalued and one 
overvalued.  Id. at 119-20.  Whereas the undervalued stocks modestly outperformed 
the market, the overvalued stocks dramatically underperformed.  Id. at 120-23.  The 
authors thus concluded that stock mispricing is “mostly on the short side.”    
58
 During periods when a company is not seeking to raise money in the capital 
markets (i.e., most of the time), managers would appear to have little to gain, and 
much to lose, from false optimism.  Because the disappointing truth is likely to 
emerge eventually, managers who conceal negative information are likely to get 
caught, subjecting their firm and themselves to potential adverse reputational and 
legal consequences.  See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
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managers will tend to be systematically optimistic in their portrayals of their 
corporation’s business and will thus be less likely to correct over-pricing 
than under-pricing.  As Professor Donald Langevoort has explained, 
corporate managers face “last period” and “multiple audience” problems, 
cognitive and motivational biases, and information flow difficulties that, 
taken together, lead them to highlight price-enhancing information while 
suppressing price-decreasing information.59 Moreover, even if managers 
were motivated to correct overvaluation, they might not be able to do so, for 
overvaluation is more difficult to correct than undervaluation.60
i. Last Period and Multiple Audience Problems
While a corporate manager’s candor tends to create trust in the capital 
markets and to further the firm’s (and the manager’s own) long-run 
interests,61 managers may nonetheless fail to be forthcoming with stock 
price-correcting bad news because they face “last period” and “multiple 
audience” problems. The “last period” problem exists when the undisclosed 
news is so bad that it might cause insolvency or some kind of managerial 
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-77 
(1984) (describing management’s interest in its own trustworthiness).  In theory, 
senior managers – those in charge of corporate disclosure – should have a natural 
tendency toward candor, for their interests are contractually aligned with the long-
term success of the firm (often as reflected in its share price), and the firm and its 
share price are more likely to be successful in the long run if management develops 
a reputation for honesty and forthrightness.  See Donald Langevoort, Organized 
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market 
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 106 (1997) 
(noting that, according to conventional economic analysis, “the interests of the 
company’s highest executives are usually (albeit not always) fairly closely aligned 
with the ongoing interests of the firm, so that the question of why senior managers 
would engage in secondary-market deception remains an interesting one”); id. at 
112 (“Senior management’s group interests are contractually aligned with the long-
term success of the firm as reflected in its share price, and the firm benefits from a 
reputation for honesty.”).  This tendency toward candor should be strengthened by 
the fact that disclosure decisions are usually made by teams of managers, so 
deception or concealment generally requires a sort of complicity that invites 
defection by individuals seeking to further their own reputations.  Id. (“Given that 
some concerted effort by senior managers is usually required to distort the market 
successfully, there are difficult coordination problems that act as natural deterrents 
to this kind of conspiracy.”).
59
 Langevoort, supra note 58, at 114-56.
60 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 14-17 (explaining why measures that typically correct 
undervaluation cannot correct overvaluation).
61 See supra note 58.
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shake-up.62  If senior managers think the undisclosed bad news will result in 
company insolvency or in their being fired or demoted, then they may 
decide that the costs to them of misleading disclosures (or omissions) are 
less than the costs to them of candor.63  Thus, they may forego candor when 
they possess price-decreasing information, whereas they almost certainly 
would not do so if the undisclosed news were price-enhancing.  
The “multiple audience” problem results from the fact that corporate 
managers cannot make targeted disclosures of negative information only to 
shareholders.  When managers make a corporate disclosure, they inform not 
only shareholders, but also other corporate constituencies, such as 
consumers, employees, and suppliers.64  They may therefore conceal price-
decreasing information in order to protect relationships with those 
constituencies, even though doing so may injure the firm’s relationship with 
investors, thereby raising the cost of capital, etc.65
ii. Cognitive and Motivational Biases That 
Produce Excessive Optimism
The last period and multiple audience problems explain why even 
wholly rational managers sometimes refrain from revealing price-decreasing 
information.  Irrational optimism among managers would, of course, 
exacerbate the situation. Evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that 
62 See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on 
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 724-27 
(summarizing data showing that fraud on the market generally occurs when agents 
are afraid they are in their last period of employment).  See also Reinier Kraakman, 
et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L. J. 1733, 
1760 n. 80 (1994) (endorsing the view of Arlen and Carney).
63
 Langevoort, supra note 58, at 114 (“If the senior management group believes that 
it faces the threat of company insolvency, with the high probability of group firing, 
then it will see the tradeoff for not lying as one of the threatened loss of salary, 
bonuses, and perquisites, plus any personal reputational damage resulting from such 
a termination.”); Arlen & Carney, supra note 62, at 693 (noting that “Fraud on the 
Market usually occurs when agents fear themselves to be in their last period of 
employment.”).
64
 Langevoort, supra note 58, at 116 (“When a company issues a press release, there 
are many different groups of audience, and no public form of communication is 
capable of simultaneously delivering one message to investors while sending a 
completely different message to another group.”).
65 Id. (noting that “fake optimism,” which seems puzzling if viewed only in terms of 
investor relations, “is not so puzzling if we see the false publicity as directed to 
other audiences,” such as retailers and customers).
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managers may be subject to cognitive and motivational biases66 that 
manifest themselves in an irrational tendency to discount negative corporate 
developments and to be falsely optimistic about their firms’ chances of 
success.
a. Confirmatory and Commitment 
Biases
Cognitive psychologists have observed that individuals who must 
process a large volume of information frequently adopt heuristics, or mental 
shortcuts, to assist them with that task.67 Often, those heuristics involve the 
creation of coherent “stories” into which the individuals attempt to “fit” the 
information they receive.68 Confronted with sufficient inconsistent 
information, individuals will eventually revise their stories to fit the 
evidence, but such revision requires the use of scarce cognitive resources 
and is therefore disfavored.  Thus, in an attempt to process information as 
efficiently as possible, individuals will unconsciously tend to construe 
information and events in a manner that confirms their prior beliefs, 
attitudes, and impressions.69 For corporate managers, this tendency may 
66
 Cognitive biases result from the fact that individuals are simply incapable of 
processing the tremendous amount of information available to them (i.e., their 
rationality is “bounded”).  Those biases manifest themselves as mental shortcuts, or 
“heuristics,” designed to permit individuals to process the vast quantities of 
information they encounter.  Langevoort, supra note 58, at 134 n. 113 (noting that 
cognitive biases “exist simply to manage complexity and make action possible in a 
world of bounded rationality”).  Motivational biases, by contrast, do not directly 
assist in cognition but instead help an individual achieve some (perhaps latently) 
desired end other than mere cognition.  Id. (“[Motivational] biases exist because 
they serve some adaptive function not grounded in rationality, and thus are the more 
likely source of mythical beliefs.”).
67
 Langevoort, supra note 58, at 135 (“A well-documented tendency of people who 
must operate in noisy informational environments is to adopt heuristic forms of 
thought.”).
68 Id. (“Commonly, people build schemas to provide them with ‘best available’ 
interpretations.”).
69 Id. (“When given enough motivation, people will revise their schemas to reflect 
new information.  But processing limits lead to a bias against revision: The normal 
cognitive strategy is to construe information and events in such a way as to confirm 
prior attitudes, beliefs, and impressions.”).  This confirmatory bias, described in the 
text as a cognitive bias, may have motivational bases as well.  At the individual 
level, revising a story causes anxiety, particularly if the revised story indicates that 
prior beliefs were mistaken and/or that plans for the future should be revisited.  Id. 
at 136 (“Revising a schema is anxiety-provoking, especially if it opens up a host of 
troubling possibilities.”).  Accordingly, individuals may be unconsciously averse to 
evaluating evidence in a way that calls on them to revise their own stories.  With 
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result in a “commitment” bias70 under which the managers strongly resist 
evidence that previously selected courses of action were ill-chosen.71 The 
upshot of the confirmatory and commitment biases, of course, is that 
managers will tend to view new information as confirming prior beliefs and 
the wisdom of past decisions – which means that they will tend to evaluate 
new information optimistically.
b. Illusion of Control
A second optimism bias stems from the fact that managers officially 
“control” corporate endeavors.  There is substantial empirical support in the 
psychology literature for the proposition that individuals systematically 
respect to group decisionmaking (the sort that generally occurs in business 
organizations), story revision is disfavored because of the threat it poses to group 
cohesiveness.  The need to revise a story implies that the group, or, more likely, 
some portion thereof, was wrong in the past.  Thus, group members will have to 
undergo the stability-threatening process of assigning blame, reallocating 
responsibilities, etc.  Because they typically desire to avoid these stresses, group 
members will unconsciously tend to construe information in a story-confirming 
fashion.  Id. at 138.  
70
 Professor Langevoort treats the confirmatory and commitment biases as different 
biases.  See id. at 135-38, 142.  The distinction makes sense if the confirmatory bias 
is viewed as a cognitive bias (designed to permit the decisionmaker to process large 
volumes of information) and the commitment bias as a motivational bias (designed 
to avoid the stresses and other negative effects associated with changing course).  
See supra note 66 (defining  cognitive and motivational biases).  As noted, however, 
see supra note 69, and as recognized by Professor Langevoort, see Langevoort, 
supra note 58, at 136, the confirmatory bias may be conceived of as a motivational 
bias as well.  So conceived, its resemblance to the commitment bias is striking.  For 
present purposes, then, it is sufficient to lump the biases together, for both manifest 
themselves in a reluctance to change course and therefore result in a tendency to 
view new information in a decision-confirming (i.e., optimistic) fashion.
71 See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for Coping with 
Accountability:  Conformity, Complexity and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989) (noting that subjects who committed themselves to 
particular positions were more concerned with self-justification and engaged in less 
self-criticism).  The confirmatory and commitment biases may result in managers’ 
“throwing good money after bad.”  For example, some scholars have argued that the 
commitment bias is a primary cause of the chronic overcapacity that is common in 
industry.  See Edward J. Zajac & Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots in Industry and 
Competitor Analysis:  Implications of Interfirm (Mis)perceptions for Strategic 
Decisions, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 37, 45-47 (1991) (noting that firms may 
irrationally escalate commitment to expand capacity).  
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overrate their own abilities and achievements.72  And, of course, if people 
overrate their own abilities, they will tend to over-estimate the likelihood 
that decisions they made were “right” and will lead to desirable results.73
The implication in terms of managerial optimism should be clear:  Managers 
tend to believe they control their businesses’ affairs, and they therefore tend 
to over-estimate their businesses’ prospects for success.74  Indeed, this bias 
toward optimism is likely stronger in business organizations than elsewhere, 
for optimists tend to be favored in the hiring process75 and in promotion 
decisions.76
c. General Self-Serving Beliefs
Whereas self-aggrandizement is an indirect end of the confirmatory, 
commitment and control biases,77 some patterns of inference pursue self-
promotion in a more general and direct fashion. The self-serving inference, 
well-recognized by cognitive psychologists, manifests itself in a general 
tendency to “see what one wants to see.”78 What one wants to see, of 
72
 Langevoort, supra note 58, at 139 (“One of the most robust findings in the 
literature on individual decisionmaking is that of the systematic tendency of many 
people to overrate their own abilities, contributions, and talents.”).
73 See MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 37-39 
(3d ed. 1994) (discussing overconfidence among managers and summarizing 
experiment in which a sample of people who expressed near total certainty that their 
judgments were right (1000-to-1 odds) were in fact right only about 81% to 88% of 
the time).
74 See J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance (Sept. 1997) 
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=71411) (“[P]eople are more optimistic about 
outcomes that they believe they can control.  Consistent with this first experimental 
finding, survey evidence indicates that managers underplay inherent uncertainty, 
believing that they have large amounts of control over the firm’s performance.”)
75 See Langevoort, supra note 58, at 140 (noting that “[o]ptimists are prized in the 
hiring process” and observing that numerous corporations utilize hiring tests 
designed by a leading research psychologist to assess high levels optimism). 
76 Id. (“[T]here is good reason to believe that the tournament-like competition for 
promotion up the executive ladder overweights optimism and its associated 
behavioral traits, inflating such behavior toward the top of the hierarchy.”).
77
 Under the confirmatory and commitment biases, prior beliefs and decisions are 
elevated, suggesting that the decision maker was wise in the past.  The illusion of 
control is manifested in beliefs that the decision maker controls things and does so 
well and is therefore praiseworthy. 
78 See Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential 
Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 568 (1992) (analyzing “the notion that people are less 
skeptical consumers of desirable than undesirable information”); THOMAS 
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course, is something that is in her self-interest and is not threatening to her 
self-esteem or career prospects.79  Thus, as Professor Langevoort explains, 
“Management groups may subconsciously perceive information in a way, if 
at all possible, that permits them to maintain consistency with their self-
image of efficacy and control, thereby justifying (to themselves and others) 
preservation of their position and status.”80 This implies that management
will tend to ignore negative (price-decreasing) information or irrationally 
spin it positively.
Taken together, the confirmatory/commitment, control, and general self-
serving biases will tend to prevent even fully-informed managers from 
accurately perceiving (and thus from accurately disclosing) price-decreasing
information.81 Perhaps more importantly, managers cannot reveal 
information of which they are not aware.  For reasons explained in the 
following paragraphs, managers are less likely to be aware of price-
decreasing information than price-increasing information.
iii. Corporate Information Flow and Managerial 
Ignorance
Much of the information concerning the success of a firm’s endeavors –
particularly non-quantifiable, “soft” information, such as the degree of 
consumer enthusiasm for new products, the progress of products through the 
research and development pipeline, etc. – is not immediately available to the 
firm’s senior managers.  Instead, the agents with the most direct access to 
this information tend to be non-managerial employees and low- to mid-level 
GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO 75-87, 76 (discussing the “tendency for 
people to believe…what they want to believe”).
79
 Langevoort, supra note 58, at 144.
80 Id.
81
 One might wonder, of course, why market forces would not weed out those 
corporations (or those managers) that tend toward false optimism.  See Langevoort, 
supra note 58, at 148 (“[S]hould we not expect those firms with unrealistic belief 
systems that do not learn from their errors to disappear, leaving only those that have 
successfully countered the problem of cognitive bias?”).  Professor Langevoort 
suggests that these managerial biases may persist, despite the competitive 
environments in which businesses operate, because “punishment” of irrational firms 
takes too long to provide effective discipline, id. at 151 (noting that “because of 
variations in the intensity of competition, we cannot assume that firms with bias-
filled cultures will necessarily die quickly” and that therefore “biases may persist 
for unusually long periods of time”), and because the biases may be adaptive, id. at 
152-56, 152 (“Put simply, there is reason to suspect that firms that inculcate certain 
types of [optimistic] belief systems may in many settings be competitively superior 
to those that are more doggedly ‘realistic.’”).   
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managers.82  Senior managers, then, must rely on their underlings to provide 
them with information regarding crucial aspects of the firm’s prospects.  
The “upward” information flow from non-managerial employees and 
middle-managers to top management poses a difficult problem for large 
business organizations, which must devise means for ensuring orderly 
information flow.83
The problem is that there is a danger at each stage of the information-
relay system that material information will be suppressed or exaggerated in 
some fashion, as each information-provider will be tempted to tweak her 
message to conform to her self-interest.84 Seeking promotion or other 
rewards, she has an incentive to inform her superiors of every bit of value-
enhancing information of which she is aware.85  By contrast, if she knows 
her endeavors are not going as well as expected, she may positively spin that 
information or keep it to herself in the hope that things will turn around 
soon.86 By the time the price-affecting information reaches the senior 
82 See, e.g., Jane E. Dutton, et al., Reading the Wind: How Idle Managers Assess the 
Context for Selling Issues to Top Managers, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 407, 407 
(1997) (“It is often middle managers rather than the top managers who have their 
hands on the ‘pulse of the organization.’”).
83 See Manne, supra note 25, at 14 (“Top-level managers are regularly beset with 
enormous problems of getting appropriate, truthful, and timely information for 
making decisions.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory 
Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1013-
14 (1998) (summarizing types of information-transmission problems corporate 
managers confront); MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN 
A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 118 (1987) (“Ideas relating to the…financial decisions of top 
management…are likely to be processed as they make their way toward the top 
managers of a firm.”); KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 33-43 
(1974) (discussing difficulties of information flow within organizations).
84 See Langevoort, supra note 58, at 120 (“[I]f material information must pass 
through a number of relay points in a hierarchy, the message can change (and lose 
accuracy) in the process.”).
85 See id. at 121 (noting that “[c]ompensation is often subjective and set by the 
immediate supervisor,” so that “the natural reporting temptation is to transmit 
information in a way that minimizes the potential for blaming oneself for bad news, 
and to convey as much good news as possible to the extent that the information can 
be attributed to the source—consistent, of course, with a general desire to have a 
reputation for credibility with one’s superiors”); Martha S. Feldman & James G. 
March, Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol, 26 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 171, 
176 (1981) (“Information is gathered and communicated in a context of conflict of 
interest and with consciousness of potential decision consequences.  Often, 
information is produced in order to persuade someone to do something.”). 
86
 The danger that underlings will keep negative information to themselves is 
heightened in firms that have attempted to achieve orderly information flow by 
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managers in charge of corporate disclosure, it is likely to have been 
“massaged” so as to make underlings look good.87  In other words, it is 
likely to be positively biased. Unaware of negative information, the senior 
managers in charge of corporate disclosures can neither directly disclose the 
bad news nor factor it into their more general forecasts.
iv. Difficulty of Correction
Even if corporate managers were as likely to perceive overvaluation as 
undervaluation and were equally motivated to correct both forms of 
mispricing, they would be more likely to correct undervaluation than 
overvaluation because they have more effective means of doing so.  
Consider a manager confronted with evidence that her company is 
undervalued.  She might issue a press release explaining why the market 
was undervaluing her firm, or she could initiate a stock repurchase, thereby 
signaling management’s strong belief that the stock is undervalued.88
Managers finding undervalued equity to be a chronic problem could adopt 
equity- based compensation schemes for executives (e.g., payment in stock 
or stock options).89
A manager confronting overvalued equity, by contrast, is somewhat 
strapped.  As a practical matter, managerial candor is not an option, for a 
manager who directly announced to the market that his corporation’s stock 
instructing underlings to distinguish between the unusual and the usual and to limit 
information flow to the former.  See Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of 
Managing, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1382, 1403 (describing the reporting rule of 
“management by exception”).  An underling who may choose which information is 
unusual may exercise this discretion to suppress negative information. 
87 See Dutton, et al., supra note 82, at 409 (observing that “people tend to 
control…information about themselves that will affect others’ perceptions of 
them”); R. Joseph Monsen, Jr. & Anthony Downs, A Theory of Large Managerial 
Firms, 73 J. POL. ECON. 221, 236 (1965) (asserting that “[m]anagers are ‘economic 
men’ who desire to maximize their own lifetime incomes” and that large firms 
develop bureaucratic structures that “tend to…provide biased information to top 
management which reflects its own desires and ideas too strongly”). 
88 See Ok-rial Song, Hidden Social Costs of Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 J. 
CORP. L. 425, 445 (2002) (“Since a stock buyback announcement signals 
management’s information about their company’s undervaluation, the stock price 
rises in response to revelation of this information.”).
89 Cf. John C. Coffee, What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic 
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 275-76 (2004) (observing that 
equity-based compensation, which grew as a percentage of the compensation of 
CEOs of public corporations from five percent in 1990 to over sixty percent in 
1999, “induce[s] management to obsess over their firm’s day-to-day share price”).   
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was overpriced probably would not keep his job for very long.90  Nor could 
the manager correct the mispricing by engaging in a sale transaction that 
would send the reverse signal of a stock repurchase.  Whereas the signal 
sent by a stock buy-back is relatively unambiguous, a sale transaction 
designed to signal overvaluation (e.g., an equity offering or a sale of 
treasury shares the corporation previously purchased) is much noisier.  It 
could easily be interpreted as a means of raising capital for some sort of 
corporate undertaking.  And, of course, equity-based compensation, which 
helps prevent undervaluation, exacerbates overvaluation by inducing
managers to drive the share price higher even when they know the company 
is overvalued.91 Finally, the market for corporate control, which provides a 
final stop-gap against undervaluation,92 cannot remedy overvaluation.  As 
Professor Jensen has observed, “[i]t is difficult, to say the least, to buy up an 
overvalued company, eliminate its overvaluation, and make a profit.”93
Thus, there is an asymmetry in the degree to which managers and market 
forces are able to correct the different species of mispricing: the primary 
options available for correcting negative mispricing are not practically 
available when the mispricing is in the positive direction.
b. Analysts Are Less Likely to Correct 
Overvaluation.
Managers, of course, are not the only potential source of price-
correcting information about a company whose stock is mispriced.  
Professional stock analysts make a career out of discovering instances of 
over- or undervaluation and advising their clients to trade accordingly.94
90
 Professor Jensen contends that boards of directors would not take kindly to 
managerial candor aimed at correcting overvaluation.  He explains:
How could [a manager of an overvalued firm] argue to [his] board 
that a major effort must be made to reduce the price of the stock?  
In the last 10 years there has simply been no listening in boards 
for this problem.  The likely result for any CEO in this situation is 
that the board would respond by saying: “If you cannot do it we 
will get someone who can.”
See Jensen, supra note 1, at 10 (emphasis in original).
91 See id. at 14 (noting that “equity-based incentives are like throwing gasoline on a 
fire – they make the problem [of overvaluation] worse, not better”).
92 Id. (observing that “[t]he market for corporate control solved many of the 
problems of undervalued equity in the 1970s and 1980s through hostile takeovers, 
leveraged buyouts, and management buyouts”).
93 Id.
94
 All the major Wall Street brokerage firms and investment banks employ teams of 
equity analysts, called “sell-side” analysts because they work for brokerage firms 
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These highly-skilled analysts are afforded tremendous access to corporate 
information and thus ought to be able to identify and inform the market of 
overvaluation.95
Empirical evidence indicates, however, that analysts’ projections are 
optimistically biased,96 and recent stock market events suggest that analysts 
are not very effective at publicizing overvaluation.  Consider, for example, 
analysts’ treatment of Enron Corporation, whose bankruptcy on December 
2, 2001 was at the time the largest ever.97 In the fall of 2001, each of the 
fifteen largest Wall Street firms covering Enron’s stock had “buy” 
recommendations in place.98  As late as October 26, 2001 – after Enron’s 
rather than institutional clients such as mutual funds and hedge funds, who are 
charged with monitoring the performance of major companies and reporting on their 
potential investment value.  See John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities 
Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 98 (2005) 
(describing role of sell-side analysts).  The analysts make concrete and specific 
investment recommendations for the stocks they cover.  The most common rating 
system involves five recommendations: “strong buy,” “buy,” “hold,” “sell,” and 
“strong sell.”  Id. at 98, n. 199.
95 See id. at 99 (“Wall Street equity analysts typically have numerous opportunities 
to question management about their corporations, through quarterly management 
conference calls, annual analyst meetings, and frequent interactions with the 
corporation’s investor relations staff.”). 
96 See, e.g., David Dreman & Michael Berry, Analyst Forecasting Errors and Their 
Implications for Security Analysts, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30 (1995); Scott E. Stickel, 
Predicting Individual Analyst Earnings Forecasts, 28 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 409 
(1990).  The optimism bias to which analysts are subject is vividly illustrated by 
events that occurred at Merrill Lynch between 1999 and 2002.  See Affidavit of Eric 
R. Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business 
Law Section 354 (April 2002) (affidavit of Assistant Attorney General of State of 
New York in Spitzer v. Merrill Lynch et al., available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/
press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf). Without explanation, Merrill Lynch’s Internet 
Research Group decided to stop issuing “reduce” and “sell” recommendations.  Id.
at 8-10.  Moreover, Merrill analysts issued highly positive recommendations on 
stocks they were contemporaneously describing internally as “piece[s] of crap,” 
“piece[s] of junk,” and “piece[s] of shit.”  Id. at 13.
97 See The Largest Bankruptcies 1980–Present, available at http://www.
bankruptcydata.com/Research/15_Largest.htm (visited July 21, 2005).  Enron’s 
bankruptcy was eventually eclipsed by that of Worldcom Inc. some eight months 
later.  See id.
98 STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., 
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AT ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 34 
(Comm. Print 2002).  Professor John Coffee maintains that the analysts should have 
known better:
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CFO had been forced to resign,99 the SEC had initiated an Enron 
investigation,100 and the Wall Street Journal had run several stories about 
Enron’s earnings management problems101 – ten of the fifteen largest Wall 
Street firms covering Enron maintained buy recommendations,102 as did
fifteen of seventeen top Wall Street analysts surveyed by Thompson 
Financial/First Call.103 And Enron was no outlier.  Indeed, the ratio of 
“buy” to “sell” recommendations has recently been as high as 100-to-1,104
and in the period immediately preceding a 60% drop in the NASDAQ, only 
0.8% of analysts’ recommendations were “sell” or “strong sell.”105  Thus, 
the evidence suggests that analysts, quick to report undervaluation by 
issuing buy recommendations, are less responsive to mispricing in the 
positive direction.
[A]s of December 31, 2000, Enron already had a stock price that 
was seventy times earnings and six times its book value, and had 
earned an 89% return for the year (despite a 9% decrease over the 
same period for the S&P 500 index).  Such a profile should have 
alerted any analyst who was even half awake to the possibility 
that Enron was seriously overvalued.  
John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B. U. L. REV. 301, 316 (2004).
99
 Enron CFO Andy Fastow was forced to resign from his position on October 24, 
2001.  See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE 
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 377 (2003).
100
 The SEC began an informal inquiry into Enron’s earnings management on 
October 17, 2001.  Enron publicly announced the informal probe on October 22, 
2001, and its stock price immediately sank 20 percent.  Id. at 371-72.
101
 Beginning on October 17, 2001, the Wall Street Journal ran a series of articles 
suggesting that Enron’s financial statements were misleading.  See John 
Emshwiller, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate Big Loss, WALL ST. J. C1 
(Oct. 17, 2001); Randall Smith, Partnership Spurs Enron Equity Cut, WALL ST. J. 
C1 (Oct. 18, 2001); Rebecca Smith, Enron CFO’s Partnership Had Millions in 
Profit, WALL ST. J. C1 (Oct. 19, 2001); Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, SEC 
Seeks Information on Enron Dealings with Partnerships Recently Run by Fastow, 
WALL ST. J. C1 (Oct. 23, 2001).
102
 Kroger, supra note 94, at 102 & n. 213.
103
 Susanne Craig & Jonathan Weil, Heard on the Street:  Some Analysts Remain 
Plugged Into Enron, WALL ST. J. C1 (Oct. 26, 2001).
104
 Coffee, supra note 98, at 316-17.
105
 Gene D’Avolio, Efi Gildor, & Andrei Shleifer, Technology, Information 
Production, and Market Efficiency, Discussion Paper 1929, Harvard Inst. for 
Economic Research, at 14 (Sept. 2001) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
286597).
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How could analysts fail so miserably in identifying and informing the 
market of overvaluation?  The most plausible answer is that stock analysts, 
like corporate managers, face a set of incentives that systematically biases 
them toward optimism.106  Most stock analysts are employed by firms that 
make the lion’s share of their money by providing brokerage and investment 
banking services.107 The brokerage side of those firms benefits when stocks 
change hands, and optimistic “buy” recommendations, which may be acted 
upon by a larger group of investors, are more likely to generate trading 
activity than “sell” recommendations.108 More importantly, the more 
106
 In addition to these incentive-based biases toward optimism, analysts might 
confront selection biases or cognitive biases that push them to view a company’s 
prospects optimistically.  Selection bias may be a problem if analysts follow only 
stocks that they recommend and refrain from issuing forecasts on stocks they do not 
like.  See, e.g., Maureen McNichols & Patricia O’Brien, Self-Selection and Analyst 
Coverage, 35 J. ACCOUNTING RES. 167 (1997) (finding that stock analysts add 
coverage of stocks when their information is favorable and drop coverage when 
their information is unfavorable).  Cognitive bias may be a problem if an analyst 
becomes too attached to a stock she covers, or too committed to a positive story she 
once told about a then-hot stock.  See Harrison Hong, Seeing Through the Seers of 
Wall Street: Analysts’ Career Concerns and Biased Forecasts (Princeton Working 
Paper, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~hhong/seers.pdf)  (noting possibility 
of selection and cognitive/behavioral biases but concluding that primary source of 
analyst bias is career concern).
107 While there are “non-affiliated” analysts who have no relation with investment 
banks, they play a relatively minor role in advising investors.  Some have 
questioned whether the market would support analysts if not for the role they played 
in selling securities.  Consider, for example, the remarks of David M. Becker, then 
General Counsel of the SEC:
It’s also an open question in my mind whether the public wants to 
pay what it costs to get analysts whose bias is beyond question.  
Some independent research firms are thriving.  Still, I would be 
interested in finding out whether truly independent analysis is a 
bit like legroom on an airplane.  Everyone likes it; people 
complain about the lack of it; but when push comes to shove there 
aren’t that many people willing to pay for it.
David M. Becker, Analyzing Analysts, Remarks Before the Committee on Federal 
Regulation of Securities of the American Bar Association (Aug. 7, 2001).  See also
Kroger, supra note 94, at 103 (“There is, however, no real direct market for equity 
research.”); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: 
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1045 (2003).
108
 One might initially think that any stock recommendation other than a “hold” 
would benefit a firm’s brokerage business, for a negative recommendation (e.g., 
“strong sell”) would generate sales by customers who would utilize brokers.  
Positive recommendations are more likely, however, to generate significant 
brokerage income.  Whereas a “buy” or “strong buy” recommendation can be acted 
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lucrative investment banking side of a brokerage firm’s business109 benefits 
from optimistic analyst reports.110
Issuers of securities want to make sure that the analysts employed by 
their investment bank will drum up investor enthusiasm for the issue, so as 
to command the highest price possible.111  They also want to ensure that the 
analysts continue to support the stock after the offering so that it increases in 
value.112 Managers thus carefully consider the optimism and enthusiasm of 
upon by any investor, a “sell” or “strong sell” recommendation can be acted upon 
only by individuals who currently own the stock at issue or are willing to engage in 
a short sale or to purchase a put option.  Because the latter group is significantly 
smaller than the former, a positive recommendation is likely to generate more 
trading activity, and thus more brokerage income, than a negative recommendation.  
See Coffee, supra note 89, at 317 n. 43 (“[A] buy recommendation addresses the 
entire market and certainly all the firm’s customers, while a sell recommendation 
addresses only those customers who own the stock (probably well under one 
percent) and those with margin accounts who are willing to sell the stock short.”).  
Thus, analyst optimism will be favored by firms that have large brokerage 
operations.
109
 Income from brokerage operations is a small and apparently shrinking portion of 
the business of most firms that employ analysts; the real money is in the investment 
banking side of the business.  See Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at 1046 (“Because 
of the elimination of fixed commissions and intense competition in commission 
levels, commission revenue currently reflects a relatively minor component of 
brokerage-firm revenue. For most major firms, investment banking revenue is far 
more significant.”).
110 See Kroger, supra note 94, at 103 (“[B]anks and brokers make money from 
research indirectly, in two ways: research leads to increased equity transactions for 
firm brokers, and it helps firm investment bankers sell their financial services to 
major corporations.”).
111 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at 1047 (“The issuer wants coverage from the 
analyst because a ‘rousing endorsement from a highly ranked analyst’ is believed to 
send the stock of a ‘fledging’ company into ‘orbit.’”) (quoting Jeffrey M. 
Laderman, Wall Street’s Spin Game, BUS. WK., Oct. 5, 1998, at 148); Becker, supra
note 107, at 3 (“To be most attractive to a potential underwriting client, an analyst 
has to convince the client that he is enthusiastic about the issuer’s prospects and that 
he can sow his enthusiasm among potential investors.”).
112 See Fisch & Sale, supra note 107, at 1047 (“A firm also enhances the 
attractiveness of its investment banking services if it can provide continued analyst 
coverage that will help to maintain the price of the securities subsequent to the 
offering.”).  One might expect an issuer to be disappointed by post-offering price 
appreciation, which would seem to imply that the offering price was set too low and 
that the issuer was thus deprived of capital it might otherwise have raised.  
Ironically, however, corporations tend to view offerings as successful if the post-
offering stock price increases.  See Stout, supra note 46, at 662 (“[A]necdotal 
evidence suggests that management regards an initial public offering as ‘successful’ 
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an investment bank’s analysts in determining whom to hire.  Indeed, CEOs 
report that the reputation of the analyst covering the relevant industry is an 
important determinant of their choice of an underwriter for their companies’ 
initial public and seasoned equity offerings.113  Analysts’ employers 
therefore have an interest in assuring that their analysts issue rosy reports.114
Empirical evidence suggests that the employers have structured their 
promotion and compensation schemes accordingly.  Attempting to discover 
whether analysts that issued optimistic predictions were rewarded with 
better jobs or assignments, Professors Harrison Hong and Jeffrey Kubik 
analyzed the earnings forecasts and employment histories of 12,000 analysts 
working for 600 brokerage houses between the years of 1983 and 2000.115
They found that analysts were “systematically rewarded for being optimistic 
as long as the optimism [was] within the range of accuracy that maintain[ed] 
the credibility of the analysts.”116  They also found that relatively optimistic 
analysts were much less likely to be fired or to leave a top brokerage house 
and were much more likely to be hired by a better house.117  They were also 
given better assignments than their more pessimistic (realistic?) 
colleagues.118  For analysts covering stocks underwritten by their brokerage 
houses, the connection between forecast accuracy and career advancement 
was significantly more attenuated, and the dependence of career prospects 
if the price of the issue in the aftermarket rises substantially above the offering 
price.”).  This reasoning may make sense if managers are issuing stock for reasons 
other than simply to raise capital as cheaply as possible; they might, for example, be 
more concerned with enhancing their or their firms’ status and prestige, with 
creating a public market for insiders’ shares, or with increasing their firm’s ability 
to acquire other businesses for stock instead of cash.  Id. at 663. 
113 See Hong, supra note 106, at 2-3.
114
 Thus, Morgan Stanley’s managing director of corporate finance famously stated 
in an internal memorandum:
Our objective is . . . to adopt a policy, fully understood by the 
entire Firm, including the Research Department, that we do not 
make negative or controversial comments about our clients as a 
matter of sound business practice. . . . Again, the philosophy and 
practical result needs to be “no negative comments about our 
clients.”
The Rohrbach Memo: “No Negative Comments,” WALL ST. J. (July 14, 1992) at 
A6.
115
 Harrison Hong & Jeffrey Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and 
Biased Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. FIN. 313 (2003).
116
 Hong, supra note 106, at 4 (summarizing the findings of Hong & Kubik (2003)).
117 Id.
118 Id.
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on forecast optimism was significantly larger.119 It thus seems that analysts’ 
personal incentives have been aligned with the incentives of their employers 
– i.e., to issue enthusiastic and optimistic recommendations.  Accordingly, 
analysts cannot be counted on to provide investors with the “bad news” 
necessary to correct instances of overvalued equity.120
2. Overvaluation Is More Harmful to Investors Than Is 
Undervaluation.
Of course, it would matter little that managers and analysts are unlikely 
to correct overvaluation, and thus the argument for liberalizing PDIT would 
be weak, if overvaluation caused little harm to investors or to society in 
general.  And one might initially wonder how overvaluation could cause any
harm to investors, who generally want the market to value the stocks in their 
portfolios as highly as possible.  It is therefore useful to examine the harms 
investors suffer as a result of stock mispricing.  Such examination reveals 
that equity overvaluation causes greater investor harm than equity 
undervaluation.
a. Greater Allocative Inefficiency
Most commentators considering the costs of inaccurate stock prices 
have focused on the allocative inefficiency caused by mispricing.121  In a 
119 Id. at 5.
120
 It is no answer to say that the market will see through rosy analyst reports.  As an 
initial matter, the empirical evidence (although sparse) suggests that the market does 
not see through these biased reports.  Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict 
of Interest and the Credibility of Underwrite Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 653, 671-78 (1999) (providing empirical evidence suggesting that 
market has failed to discount excessive analyst optimism).  Perhaps this is because 
the sophistication of the marginal investor is diminishing, see D’Aviolo, et al., 
supra note 105, at 2-3, which decreases the likelihood that bias will be recognized.  
The market may eventually learn to discount analyst optimism (investor 
sophistication can hardly diminish indefinitely), but at this point, the marginal 
investor is apparently somewhat ignorant of the fact that analyst reports are biased.  
Ultimately, though, whether the market will or will not see through rosy analyst 
reports is irrelevant to the matter at hand.  The point here is that analysts cannot be 
counted upon to provide price-decreasing information to correct stock 
overvaluation.  Even if they do not exacerbate the problem (because the market 
discounts what they are saying), they certainly do not help alleviate it. 
121 See, e.g., Stout, supra note 46, at 640-41 (“Commentators who stop to address 
the question [of why informationally efficient markets are desirable] generally 
conclude that informational efficiency—which addresses only the market’s speed in 
adjusting prices to new information—is desirable because it serves allocative 
efficiency—the proper allocation of scarce resources among competing alternate 
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market economy, decision makers look to prices in determining how to 
allocate resources to their most highly valued uses.122 Inaccurate securities 
prices are generally considered to be undesirable because they result in an 
improper channeling of investment capital.123
While one might initially expect undervaluation and overvaluation to 
create allocative inefficiencies of similar magnitude, overvaluation likely
causes greater allocative inefficiency than undervaluation.  A firm whose 
stock is undervalued can raise the capital it needs to fund expenditures by 
tapping funding sources besides the equity markets.124  For example, it can 
uses.” Id. at 640-41); David J. Schulte, The Debatable Case for Securities 
Disclosure Regulation, 13 J. CORP. L. 535, 539-42 (1988) (arguing that securities 
prices are important because of their effect on allocative efficiency); John Coffee, 
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 717, 734 (1984) (observing that securities prices are important “not so 
much because of their distributive consequences on investors but because of their
effect on allocative efficiency”); Merritt Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated 
Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 1005, 1015 (1984) (noting benefits of accurate prices in efficient market); 
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 866 (“The more accurately prices reflect 
information, the better prices guide capital investment in the economy.”).  But see
Stout, supra note 46, at 643-68 (arguing that benefits of efficient stock prices have 
been overstated).  
122 See F.A. Hayek, supra note 34, at 526 (discussing how the price mechanism 
leads to an efficient allocation of resources throughout the economy).
123
 Consider an economy with two firms – one with high expected future earnings 
and the other with the same assets but lower expected future earnings.  More total 
wealth will be created if money from investors is allocated to the former firm, 
which will generate more value in the long run.  If stock prices accurately reflect the 
discounted expected value of each company’s future earnings, the stock of the 
former company will be priced higher than that of the latter, and the former 
company will raise more money than the latter by selling the same percentage of its 
equity.  Investment capital will therefore migrate in the right direction.  If, however, 
stock prices are inaccurate – say, a ten percent share of the former company is 
priced the same as a ten percent share of the latter – then investment resources are 
unlikely to be channeled to their highest and best use.
124 See Stout, supra note 46, at 645 (noting that “[c]orporations can finance their 
projects through a number of means other than issuing stock,” including “internally 
generated revenue” and “[a] host of forms of debt”).  Professor Stout adds:
The argument that efficient stock markets are essential to allocate 
properly investment capital assumes that, despite a plethora of 
alternate financing sources, corporations rely primarily on stock 
issues for raising funds.  That assumption is at odds with actual 
corporate financing behavior.  In fact, firms largely appear to 
avoid the stock market as a source of funding.
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raise money through corporate borrowing.  While some have argued that the 
corporation with a high and rising stock price can borrow more, and at a 
lower cost of capital, than the corporation whose stock is declining,125 the 
connection between stock price and borrowing ability seems tenuous.126
First, managers of firms with undervalued stock prices can explain to 
lenders why their stock price is not reflective of future earnings.  If they 
have a compelling story, they should be able to borrow the funds they 
need.127  Moreover, the banking literature indicates that lenders measure 
loan risk – and thus determine the amount they are willing to lend and the
interest rate they will charge – by comparing the corporation’s outstanding 
debt to the value of its assets, not the market price of its stock.128  In short, 
managers of a firm whose stock is undervalued can and likely will correct 
the problem with capital providers and will eventually get what they need, 
albeit perhaps at a higher cost. By contrast, management of an overvalued
firm has no incentive to “correct” the mispricing when dealing with capital 
providers, and empirical research (discussed below) indicates that managers 
are more likely cause their firm to issue equity when it is overvalued.129
Thus, overvaluation may ultimately cause greater allocative inefficiency 
than undervaluation.
This social cost of overvalued equity, though, is not much of a “harm” 
to the shareholders of the mispriced firm.  While society as a whole may be 
worse off because of the allocative inefficiency resulting from a firm’s
overvaluation, that inefficiency results because the firm is able to raise more 
money at a given cost than it ought to be able to raise.130  Any harm the 
firm’s shareholders experience by virtue of the allocative inefficiency 
Id. at 645-46. 
125 See, e.g., WILLIAM BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
81 (1965); H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 123 (1979).
126 See Stout, supra note 46, at 648-51 (arguing that stock prices play little influence 
in decisions to extend credit).
127 Id. at 649-50 (“The bank that readily lends on the basis of high share value 
unsupported by assets or revenues is unlikely to stay in the banking business long.  
Nor would rational lenders be deterred by depressed stock prices if the assets and 
revenues to support the loan exist.”).
128 See id. at 650 & n. 202 (citing numerous sources from banking literature).
129 See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
130
 Professors Carlton and Fischel recognized the flip-side of this assertion – i.e., 
that accurate stock prices are beneficial to society as a whole, but not necessarily to 
individual firms or their investors.  See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 866-67 
(“From the perspective of an individual firm, however, efficient capital markets are 
a public good, unless private, as opposed to social, gains accrue to the firm when the 
prices of its own securities convey accurate information.”). 
33
injected into the economy as a whole is dwarfed by the immediate benefit 
they receive from the firm’s enhanced ability to raise capital.131  Thus, 
concern about inefficient allocation of investment capital occasioned by 
their firm’s overvaluation likely would not cause shareholders to value 
protection from overvaluation.
But shareholders might value such protection, and pay a premium for it,
if overvaluation causes other costs that are concentrated more completely on 
shareholders.  That appears to be the case. Recent economic events suggest 
that stock overvaluation causes at least three types of inefficiency that, 
unlike the inefficient allocation of investment capital, are borne primarily by 
the shareholders of an overvalued firm.  First, overvaluation increases the 
agency costs involved in running a corporation.  In addition, it saddles 
investors with expected reliance costs that tend to exceed the expected
reliance costs occasioned by equity undervaluation.  Finally, it increases the 
costs of monitoring managerial performance .
b. Greater Agency Costs
Agency costs are the costs that arise from cooperative effort by human 
beings.132  They appear whenever any principal hires an agent to act on his 
or her behalf, for the agent will always have an incentive to act 
opportunistically or to shirk (which is, of course, a form of opportunism), 
and the principal must therefore take steps to prevent or insure against such 
behavior.133  Agency costs may thus be defined as the sum of the 
contracting, monitoring, and bonding costs incurred to reduce the conflicts 
of interest between principal and agent, plus the residual loss that occurs 
because it is generally impossible to perfectly identify the interests of agents
and their principals.134  In a corporation, agency costs arise because the 
directors, officers, and other managers charged with running the 
corporation’s business have interests that conflict with the corporation’s 
residual claimants, the shareholders.135 While capital markets generally 
131
 While this total benefit is smaller than the total cost associated with the firm’s 
overvaluation, the shareholders capture all the benefit but externalize much of the 
cost.  Thus, their individual benefit from overvaluation likely exceeds, at least in the 
short- term, the harm they suffer as participants in the larger economy.
132
 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) 
(noting that “agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort”).
133 Id. at 308.
134 Id. at 308-09.
135 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1325, 1332 (1998) (“If the managers (the 
agents of shareholders and the corporation) pursue their own interests—such as 
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operate as a powerful tool for minimizing agency costs (because firms that 
have developed effective mechanisms for lowering such costs will be most 
attractive to investors),136 recent economic developments suggest that, when 
equity becomes overvalued, securities markets tend to exacerbate agency 
costs.137
A corporation’s expected agency costs are a function of two factors: the
likelihood that managers and investors will have divergent interests,138 and 
the magnitude of investor loss that will result if managers put their own 
interests ahead of investors’.139  Because (1) overvaluation is more likely 
than undervaluation to cause managers’ interests to diverge from those of 
investors and (2) the investor loss occasioned by managers’ pursuing their 
own, rather than investors’, interests is likely to be greater when stock 
mispricing is in the positive direction, overvaluation is likely to generate 
significantly higher agency costs than undervaluation. To see this point, 
compare undervalued and overvalued firms in terms of the likelihood of 
divergence between managers’ and stockholders’ interests and the degree of 
shareholder loss stemming from managerial opportunism.
i. Agency Costs in the Undervalued Firm
When a firm’s equity is undervalued, the incentives of shareholders and 
managers are likely to be closely aligned:  Both groups will usually want to 
increase stock price so that it reflects fundamental value.  Shareholders will
desire this result because price appreciation adds to their long-term wealth140
leisure or perks, or their own prestige—rather than the interests of shareholders (the 
principal), shareholders suffer the consequences.”).
136
 Jensen, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that markets have been viewed as “potent 
forces to help control agency costs”).  Labor markets also help control agency costs, 
for managers who do not pursue their own interests at shareholder expense will be 
favored in the inter-firm competition for managerial talent. 
137 Id. (describing “how securities markets can sometimes create and exacerbate 
conflicts of interest between managers and owner rather than resolve them”).
138 The greater the likelihood of diverging interests, the greater the expected agency 
costs.
139
 Acts of managerial opportunism differ in the degree to which they create loss for 
investors.  For example, a manager who violates his duty of loyalty by causing the
corporation to give $50,000 to a pet charity creates less investor loss (i.e., destroys 
less corporate value) than a manager who causes the corporation to invest $50,000 
in a firm that is developing a technology that will compete with that sold by the 
investor corporation.
140
 Because the wealth accretion occurring when prices are brought up to the level 
of actual value is not likely to diminish absent a change in the fundamental value of 
the firm, the shareholder wealth effect here is long-term.  Periods of equity 
35
and enhances the corporation’s overall health (and thus its value) by making 
it easier for the firm to raise large sums of money in the capital markets.  
Managers will typically want this result because (1) it is more prestigious to 
run a company with a relatively high stock price than one with a relatively 
low stock price,141 (2) their compensation frequently will be tied to stock 
price,142 and (3) the corporation will be more flexible because it can use its 
high-priced stock as currency or raise more money for expansion in the 
capital markets.143 Given the overlap in shareholders’ and managers’
desires, it is unlikely that undervaluation will occasion any managerial 
behavior that diverges from shareholder interests.
In the unlikely event managers were dissuaded from taking steps to 
drive the stock price up to fundamental value,144 the investor loss resulting 
from such opportunism would be relatively minor.  Some loss could result if 
the company had to forego investments because its depressed stock price 
overvaluation, by contrast, enhance shareholder wealth only in the short-term.  Such 
transitory price enhancements are of little value to medium-term and long-term 
stockholders.  Short-term stockholders may benefit from transitory increases in 
price, but only if they are able to time stock sales so that they sell at the temporarily 
high price.  In practice, this is rather difficult, for investors must avoid selling too 
soon (prior to the peak) or too late (after the transitory price enhancement has 
ended).  Thus, transitory stock price increases offer little value to stockholders.  
Enhancements that drive stock prices to the level of fundamental value, by contrast, 
are not likely to be transitory and are desirable to all shareholders, regardless of the 
length of time they intend to hold their stock.  
141 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 8 (noting the prestige associated with managing a 
company with a high stock price).
142 See D’Avolio, et al., supra note 105, at 10 (noting growth in equity-based 
compensation); Coffee, supra note 89, at 275-76 (same).
143 Cf. Andre Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. 
FIN. ECON. 295, 309 (2003) (“The benefit of having a high valuation for making 
acquisitions also points to an incentive to raise a firm’s stock price even through 
earnings manipulation, a phenomenon whose presence is becoming increasingly 
apparent.”).
144
 Shirking might prevent managers from taking affirmative steps to correct 
undervalued stock prices.  Or managers might want to keep stock prices depressed 
below value if they had short-sold and needed to repurchase.  Of course,  
management short-selling is highly unlikely when a stock is undervalued.  (For 
many managers, it is illegal, see Securities Exchange Act § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 
78p(c) (2005), and those managers for whom it is an option would not short a stock 
if they knew its price was depressed below value.)  Moreover, even managers that 
had sold short would not want to keep the price depressed indefinitely; they would 
desire the low price to remain for just long enough for them to repurchase the stock 
at the depressed price.
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hampered its ability to raise money in the equity markets, but the company 
could always pursue another form of financing and could likely negotiate a 
favorable interest rate by explaining to lenders why the stock price was 
artificially depressed.145  Investors would also experience loss in that their 
portfolios would be undervalued during the period in which managers 
opportunistically failed to correct the depressed stock price.  Such periods, 
however, would likely be short. Because undervaluation could usually be 
corrected by the action of a single manager, managers would normally have 
to work in concert to keep the stock price depressed.  This coordinated 
behavior would be unlikely to occur naturally, for most managers want to 
avoid undervaluation,146 and persistent undervaluation would therefore
require some sort of collusion among managers (i.e., an agreement not to tell 
the good news that would drive up the stock price).  Any such cartel would 
be inherently unstable, given the benefits that would likely accrue to a
cheater.147  Thus, any periods of investor wealth depression occasioned by 
managers’ (improbable) failure to correct undervaluation are likely to be 
transitory.  
ii. Agency Costs in the Overvalued Firm
The situation is markedly different when a firm’s stock is overvalued.  
Unlike undervaluation, overvaluation is likely to create a substantial 
divergence in the interests of shareholders and managers, and the investor 
loss that will result if managers of overvalued firms pursue their own 
interests, rather than those of stockholders, is likely to be substantial. 
a. Greater Divergence in Interests
When a firm’s stock price is overvalued, the interests of shareholders 
and managers are likely to diverge.  Managers are unlikely to prefer that the 
stock price fall to fundamental value, for (as noted) they reap a host of 
benefits from a high stock price.148 While most managers will realize that 
overvaluation cannot last forever and that price correction is likely to occur 
145 See supra notes 126 - 128 and accompanying text.  See generally Stout, supra
note 46, at 648-50.
146 See supra notes 141 - 143 and accompanying text.
147
 Investors would love the cheater whose action corrected undervalued equity; the 
press would heap praise upon her; the labor market would reward her with a host of 
employment opportunities.  If she were a stockholder or had equity-based 
compensation, her wealth would increase.
148 See supra notes 141 - 143 and accompanying text.  As Professor Jensen has 
observed, “If you’re the CEO or CFO [of an overvalued company], you’re on TV, 
and covered by the press, investors love you, your options are increasing in value, 
and the capital markets are wide open to your firm.”  See Jensen, supra note 1, at 8.  
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eventually,149 they may nonetheless refrain from taking steps to reduce price 
to fundamental value.  Their tendencies toward optimism150 will likely lead 
them to believe either that they can eventually cause the firm to generate 
cash flows that will justify the currently inflated price or that they will be 
able to exit the corporation (by resigning their positions and selling their 
stock) prior to the inevitable price correction.151  Thus, corporate managers 
have little incentive to correct equity overvaluation.
On first glance, one might suppose that shareholders would similarly
desire for equity overvaluation to persist; after all, the higher the stock price, 
the greater a shareholder’s wealth.  Because overvaluation tends to be 
eventually corrected, however, medium- to long-term shareholders generally 
cannot capture the transitory wealth increase stemming from overvaluation
and thus will not care to extend periods of overvaluation.152 While short-
term shareholders may be able to profit from transitory periods of 
overvaluation, they can do so only if they sell their stock prior to the 
inevitable price correction.  Such a “bail before correction” strategy is much
riskier for shareholders than for managers, for shareholders know little about 
corporate events that may reveal overvaluation and are thus more likely to 
delay too long before selling their stock.  Moreover, shareholders possess 
neither actual nor apparent control over the events likely to reveal 
overvaluation and will thus tend to be less optimistic than managers about 
their ability to sell their stock before the inevitable price-correction.153
149 See Langevoort, supra note 58, at 106 (observing that “in most bad-news 
scenarios, concealment simply delays the appreciation of the truth rather than avoids 
it indefinitely”).
150 See supra notes 66 - 71 and accompanying text.
151
 For example, accounts of the financial collapse at Enron suggest that the firm’s 
managers, well aware of the corporation’s overvaluation, believed that they could 
either turn the company around or exit before collapse.  According to one prominent 
account:
Enron’s accounting games were never meant to last forever….  
The goal was to maintain the impression that Enron was humming 
until [CEO Jeff] Skilling’s next big idea kicked in and started 
raking in real profits….  In Skilling’s mind, though, there was no 
way he was going to fail.  He had always succeeded before, and 
his success had transformed the company.  Why would it be any 
different with EES and broadband?
McClean & Elkind, supra note 99, at 171.
152 See supra note 140.
153
 On the optimistic biases created by actual or apparent control over events, see 
supra notes 72 - 76 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, even short-term stockholders will value periods of 
overvaluation less than managers will.  
In addition, any “upside” experienced by shareholders during periods of 
overvaluation is likely to be counteracted by a significant downside.  For 
reasons detailed in the following paragraphs, managers are likely during 
periods of equity overvaluation to engage in behavior that destroys real 
corporate value.  Given this probability, stockholders are even more likely to 
prefer that managers correct equity overvaluation.
b. Greater Investor Losses From 
Managerial Opportunism
Whereas the investor losses stemming from a managerial failure to 
correct undervalued equity are likely to be small,154 the losses occasioned by 
equity overvaluation may be significant.  In essence, managers of 
overvalued firms are “buying time” – hoping to trick the market into 
maintaining the high stock price until they can exit the firm (both as 
shareholders and as managers) or can produce the corporate performance 
required to justify the stock price.155  Such continued trickery requires 
beating analysts’ expectations, for the capital markets routinely punish firms 
that fail to meet such expectations.156  Indeed, one recent study found that 
the average stock price of firms beating consensus analyst forecasts for the 
quarter rose 5.5% more during the quarter than a size-matched portfolio; by 
contrast, the average stock price of firms missing consensus expectations 
fell by 5.04% more during the quarter than a size-matched portfolio.157 It is
therefore crucial that managers of an overvalued firm continue to meet or 
beat analysts’ expectations.  The problem, of course, is that they cannot 
perpetually do so by exploiting legitimate value-creating opportunities.158
154 See supra notes 144 - 147 and accompanying text.
155 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 10 (noting that objective of managers of overvalued 
firm is to “postpone the day of reckoning until [they] are gone or [they] figure out 
how to resolve the issue”).  See also supra note 151.
156 See id. at 7 (observing that “CEOs and CFOs know that the capital markets will 
punish the entire firm if they miss analysts’ forecasts by as much as a penny” and 
that “the capital markets reward a firm with a premium for meeting or beating the 
analysts’ expectations during the quarter”).
157
 Douglas J. Skinner & Richard G. Sloan, Earnings Surprises, Growth
Expectations, and Stock Returns or Don’t Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your 
Portfolio, 7 REV. ACCTG. STUD. 289, 297 (2002) (Table I). 
158 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7 (“Generally, the only way for managers to meet 
those expectations year in and year out is to cook their numbers to mask the 
inherent uncertainty in their businesses.  And that cannot be done without 
sacrificing value.”).
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Once those options have been exhausted, they will eventually turn to 
gimmicks that are designed to produce numbers that appease the market but 
actually reduce long-term firm value.159
Professor Jensen has identified three such gimmicks that are routinely 
pursued by managers of overvalued firms:
To appear to be satisfying growth expectations you use your 
overvalued equity to make long run value destroying 
acquisitions; you use your access to cheap debt and equity 
capital to engage in excessive internal spending and risky 
negative net present value investments that the market 
thinks will generate value; and eventually you turn to 
further accounting manipulation and even fraudulent 
practices to continue the appearance of growth and value 
creation.160
Consider how these three gimmicks work in concert to destroy corporate 
value.
(i) Value-Destroying Acquisitions
Because corporate acquisitions create the appearance of growth (and 
thus may fool the market for at least a while), corporate managers that have 
exhausted other growth options may find such acquisitions attractive, even if 
they are ultimately value-reducing.  The findings of a recent study by 
Professors Sara Moeller, Frederick P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz are 
consistent with the claim that equity overvaluation leads managers to pursue
value-destroying acquisitions.161  The authors compared how merger 
announcements affected the stock prices of acquiring firms during the 1998-
2001 period, a period of significant equity overvaluation, with the acquiring-
firm price effects occasioned by merger announcements in the 1980s.  They 
found that, for the 1998-2001 period, the value of acquiring firms declined 
by a total of $240 billion in the three-day periods surrounding 
announcements of acquisitions.162  During all of the 1980s, by contrast, the 
159 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 8-9 (“You realize the markets will hammer you 
unless your company’s performance justifies the stock price.  So after all value 
creating alternatives have been taken you start to take actions that destroy long run 
value that you hope will at least appear to generate the market’s expected 
performance in the short run.”).
160 Id. at 6-7.
161
 Sara Moeller, Frederick P. Schlingemann & René M. Stulz, Wealth Destruction 
on a Massive Scale?  A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger 
Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757 (2005).
162 Id. at 758-59.
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loss in value of acquiring firms during the three-day period surrounding 
merger announcements was only $4.2 billion.163  Moreover, whereas the 
acquirers’ losses in the 1980s were offset by gains to acquirees, for a net 
synergy gain of $11.6 billion, such an offset did not occur in the 1998-2001 
period; rather, the losses to acquirers exceeded acquirees’ gains for a net 
synergy loss of $134 billion.164
Equity overvaluation seems to have influenced this value destruction.  
The authors found that most of the value losses were attributable to 87 
“large loss” transactions, in which the loss to each acquiring firm exceeded 
$1 billion.165  The bidders in those transactions appear to have been 
overvalued:  They had statistically significantly higher Tobin’s q and 
market-to-book ratios (both proxies for overvaluation)166 than both the 
bidders in other deals during the same time period and all bidders in the 
period from 1980-97.167  Moreover, a substantially greater proportion of 
bidders in large loss deals financed their acquisitions using equity:  71.6% of 
the bidders in large loss deals did so, as opposed to 35.2% of other bidders 
during the same time period and 30.3% of all bidders in the 1980-97 
period.168  In short, what the authors term “wealth destruction on a massive 
scale” appears to have occurred because overvalued bidders used their high-
priced stock to finance deals that, from investors’ perspective, should not 
have been pursued.169 Such findings are consistent with Professor Jensen’s 
assertion that equity overvaluation leads to unwise acquisitions that are 
163 Id. at 758, 762 (Table I).
164 Id. at 762 (Table I).
165 Id. at 759.  The total loss to the bidders’ shareholders in these transactions was 
$397 billion, which represented a cumulative abnormal return of -10.6%.  Id.  The 
average loss to acquiring-firm shareholders was $2.31 per dollar spent on the 
acquisition.  Id. at 765.
166
 Tobin’s q is, in essence, the market value of a firm’s assets divided by the 
replacement value of those assets.  Brealey & Myers, supra note 41, at 775.  
Obviously, the higher this figure, the more overvalued the firm is.  Market to book 
ratio is the market value of a firm’s assets divided by the book value of those assets.  
Id. at 774-75.  Again, the higher this figure, the more highly valued is the firm as a 
going concern.
167
 Moeller et al., supra note 161, at 773 (Table III).
168 Id. at 772 (Table III, Panel A).
169 See also Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 143 (providing model consistent with 
observation that overvalued firms engage in enhanced merger activities that produce 
negative long-run returns).
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designed to dupe the market but will ultimately be revealed, to the detriment 
of shareholders.170
(ii) Negative NPV Greenfield 
Investments and Avoidance of 
Positive NPV Investments
Equity overvaluation also tends to lead managers to reduce firm value 
by pursuing certain greenfield investments that have a negative net present 
value (NPV) and avoiding other investments that have a positive NPV. 171
As explained below, this occurs because overvaluation effectively provides 
managers with additional capital to invest in enterprise expansion,172 and, 
since managers receive private benefits from expansion, they will tend to do 
so beyond the point that is optimal for shareholders (i.e., the point at which 
the firm’s value is maximized).173  Moreover, a relatively high stock price 
tends to make marginal investment opportunities appear more valuable than 
170
 Professor Jensen explains:
The evidence is consistent with the argument…[that] management 
makes acquisitions to con the market into believing that 
management is going to create the value that the market expects, 
and is able to continue to fool it for some period of time by 
providing the illusion of growth.  When the market finds out that
the high value and growth was an illusion the firm’s value falls 
precipitously because all the overvaluation will disappear as well 
as the value of the core business that has been compromised by 
the attempts to avoid discovery. 
Jensen, supra note 1, at 11, 13.  While Professor Jensen concedes that the data are 
“also consistent with the hypothesis that the earlier acquisitions [i.e., those 
occurring prior to the large loss deal] truly created value,” id. at 13, and 
acknowledges that “[a]dditional work must be done to sort this issue out,” id., he 
points to the case of Nortel Corporation as suggesting that acquisitions by 
overvalued firms prior to a large loss deal are similarly wealth-destructive in the 
long run and that the large loss deal simply tips the market off to the acquirer’s 
overvaluation.  Id.
171
 “Greenfield investments” refers to investments in new projects, as opposed to 
acquisitions of existing enterprises.  A manager seeking to maximize the value of 
her firm (and thus shareholder wealth) should pursue all those projects where the 
discounted present value of expected project returns exceeds the discounted present 
value of the expenses associated with pursuit of the project.  Such a project would 
have a “positive NPV.”  By contrast, managers seeking to maximize shareholder 
wealth should avoid any “negative NPV” project – i.e., a project where the 
discounted present value of expected returns is less than the discounted present 
value of the project’s expenses.  See Brealey & Myers, supra note 41, at 85-106.
172 See infra notes 178 - 182 and accompanying text.
173 See infra notes 183 - 187 and accompanying text.
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they actually are, furthering the possibility that they will be pursued by 
management.174  Once managers begin a “growth strategy” of acquisitions 
and internal investments, they find that such a strategy is difficult to alter; 
they therefore tend to sacrifice firm value by pursuing the growth strategy 
for too long.175  Finally, because managers of overvalued firms live in 
constant fear of discovery by the securities markets,176 they will forego 
positive NPV projects that may temporarily reduce earnings per share.177
Consider how these forces work together to reduce firm value. 
More money to invest. When equity is overvalued, firm managers 
effectively have more capital to invest.  Most obviously, they may pay for 
expenses using their firm’s inflated stock as currency.  In addition, they can 
raise more actual cash by issuing new equity at prices reflecting their firm’s 
overvaluation.  Empirical data on the issuance of equity indicate that 
managers do, in fact, take advantage of periods of overvaluation by issuing 
equity.178  Moreover, managers admit to such behavior in anonymous 
surveys.  Professors John R. Graham and Campbell R. Harvey, for example, 
found that two-thirds of CFOs agree that “the amount by which our stock is 
undervalued or overvalued by the market” is an important or very important 
174 See infra notes 188 - 196 and accompanying text.
175 See infra notes 197 - 200 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 155 - 157 and accompanying text.
177 See infra notes 202- 204 and accompanying text.
178 See Malcolm P. Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Market Timing and Capital Structure, 
57 J. FIN. 1, __ (2002) (noting that “analyses of actual financing decisions show that 
firms tend to issue equity instead of debt when market value is high, relative to book 
value and past market values, and tend to repurchase equity when market value is 
low”).  Professors Baker and Wurgler note that numerous studies have observed a 
coincidence of seasoned equity issues and high stock prices.  Id. at __, n. 1 (citing 
Robert A. Taggart, A Model of Corporate Financing Decisions, 32 J. FIN. 1467 
(1977); Paul Marsh, The Choice Between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study, 37 
J. FIN. 121 (1982); Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Equity Issues and Offering 
Dilution, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 61 (1986); Robert Korajczyk, Deborah Lucas, & Robert 
McDonald, The Effects of Information Releases on the Pricing and Timing of Equity 
Issues, 4 REV. FIN. STUD. 685 (1991); Kooyul Jung, Cheol Kim Yong, and Rene M. 
Stulz, Timing, Investment Opportunities, Managerial Discretion, and the Security 
Issue Decision, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 159 (1996); and Armen Hovakimian, Tim Opler, & 
Sheridan Titman, The Debt-Equity Choice, 36 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 1 (2001)).  
Similarly, they note, studies observe a coincidence of high valuations and initial 
public offerings.  Id. (citing Tim Loughran, Jay Ritter, & Kristian Rydqvist, Initial 
Public Offerings: International Insights, 2 PACIFIC-BASIN FIN. J. 165 (1994) and 
Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta, & Luigi Zingales, Why Do Companies Go Public? 
An Empirical Analysis, 53 J. FIN. 27 (1998)).    
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consideration in deciding to issue equity.179  Nearly as many (62.6%) agreed 
that “if our stock has recently risen, the price at which we can sell is 
‘high.’”180 CFOs further reported that equity market prices were the second 
most important of thirteen factors normally considered in determining 
whether to issue common stock,181 and was the second most important of 
eight factors normally considered in determining whether to issue 
convertible debt.182 Equity overvaluation is therefore likely to increase the 
resources with which managers may pursue firm expansion.
Incentives to over-invest. This easy access to investment resources
causes a version of what Professor Jensen has termed the “agency costs of 
free cash flow,”183 for managers with the resources to do so are likely to
pursue firm expansion beyond the point that is optimal for stockholders.
Whereas the rational stockholder desires the firm to expand to the point at 
which its marginal cost of expansion equals the marginal value added to the 
firm because of such expansion,184 managers will tend to seek expansion to 
the point at which their private marginal benefits occasioned by the 
expansion equal their marginal cost of seeking that level of expansion 
(including, of course, the cost of any “punishment” they expect to receive
because they have pursued expansion excessively).  The problem arises 
because managers’ personal marginal costs and benefits from expansion are 
not strictly proportionate to the total costs and benefits created by the 
179
 John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of Corporate 
Finance: Evidence from the Field, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 216 (2001) (Table 8).
180 Id.
181
 CFOs ranked market price a more important factor in determining whether to 
issue common stock than “providing shares to employee bonus/stock option plans”; 
“maintaining a target debt-to-equity ratio”; “diluting the holdings of certain 
stockholders”; “stock is our ‘least risky’ source of funds”; “whether our recent 
profits have been sufficient to fund our activities”; “using a similar amount of 
equity as is used by other firms in our industry”; “issuing stock gives investors a 
better impression of our firm’s prospects than issuing debt”; “inability to obtain 
funds using debt, convertibles, or other sources”; “common stock is our cheapest 
source of funds”; and “the capital gains tax rates faced by our investors (relative to 
tax rates on dividends).”  Id. at Table 8.  The only commonly considered factor 
deemed more important than a high market price was concern about earnings per 
share dilution.  Id.
182 Id. at 221 (Table 10).
183 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Finance, 
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
184
 Because marginal costs of expansion tend to rise as expansion continues, and 
marginal benefits tend to fall, expansion beyond the point at which marginal costs 
equal marginal benefits reduces firm value.
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expansion.  Specifically, managers receive a disproportionately large share 
of the benefits of firm expansion.185  All else being equal, managers of 
bigger firms are better off than managers of smaller firms—for example, 
their job prestige grows, they have more resources under their control, and 
their compensation often increases (as managerial compensation is 
frequently related to sales volume).186  In addition, managers often have an 
interest in firm expansion as a means of providing new employment 
positions, for firms often reward middle managers with promotion rather 
than year-to-year bonuses.187 Thus, rational, self-interested managers will 
pursue a level of investment that is excessive in that it fails to maximize 
firm value.
Skewed perceptions of likely project success. In addition to the “supply 
side” effect whereby managers engage in a greater number of negative NPV 
projects because they have access to the funds with which to do so,
overvaluation may have a “demand side” effect:  It may make proposed 
projects look more profitable and may therefore cause managers to believe 
that negative NPV projects are actually positive NPV projects.  Professors 
Christopher Polk and Paola Sapienza have recently provided empirical 
evidence consistent with this observation.188
The research by Professors Polk and Sapienza builds on a prior study by 
Professor Jeremy Stein, who showed that stock price valuations affect firm 
investment through an “equity-issuance” channel.189 Professor Stein 
demonstrated that equity-dependent firms (i.e., those lacking ample access 
to cash and/or debt) would base investment decisions on their stock price, 
foregoing positive NPV investments when the price was low and the amount 
of capital that could be raised in a stock issuance was relatively small.190
The upshot of Professor Stein’s findings was that higher stock prices would 
“enable good (i.e., positive net present value) projects that otherwise would 
not occur.”191 Professors Polk and Sapienza asked a follow-up question:  
185 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 132, at 312-13.
186 See Jensen, supra note 183, at 323-24 (citing Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate 
Performance and Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACCTG. & ECON. 11 
(April 1985)).
187 See Jensen, supra note 183, at 323-24.
188 See Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Real Effects of Investor Sentiment
(July 2004), Paper Prepared for Sixth Annual Texas Finance Festival (available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=585885).
189 See Jeremy Stein, Rational Capital Budgeting in an Irrational World, 69 J. BUS.
429 (1996).
190 Id. at ___.
191
 Polk & Sapienza, supra note 188, at 2.
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Could stock price misvaluation affect firm investment decisions through a 
“catering channel” as well as an “equity-issuance” channel, so that higher 
stock prices increase the level of investment by firms that are not equity-
dependent?192  They theorized that managers expand firm investment when 
stock prices are high because they evaluate proposed projects according to 
current stock price levels.  Managers may, for example, posit multiples by 
which proposed projects will increase stock prices, thereby causing 
proposed projects to appear more desirable the higher current stock price 
is.193  If that is the case, then one would expect to find both that investment 
levels increased as stock prices rose and that increased investment was 
associated with lower returns (indicating that the increased investment was 
not merely the result of equity-dependent firms’ enhanced ability to pursue
positive NPV projects).
Professors Polk and Sapienza found both correlations.  Adjusting for 
investment opportunities, they found that firms with overpriced stock tended 
to engage in more investment.194   In addition, they found that firms which 
engaged in higher levels of investment experienced relatively lower stock 
returns.195  These findings suggest that higher equity prices do not simply 
enable firms to pursue a greater number of positive NPV investments; 
instead, they cause investment to expand to include negative NPV projects.  
192 Id.
193 Id.  Professors Polk and Sapienza explain:
If new investment projects are evaluated at the current stock 
market price, for example as in the practice of using “multiples” 
to evaluate new projects, and if there is enough asymmetry of 
information regarding project quality, a rational manager may find
it optimal to invest in projects with negative NPV even when the 
project is not financed with equity issues.  Firms with ample cash 
or debt capacity may have an incentive to waste resources when 
their stock price is overpriced and to forgo positive investment 
opportunities when their stock price is undervalued.  Thus 
mispricing may affect investment without working through an 
equity channel ….
Id. (emphasis in original).
194 Id. at 5.  Polk and Sapienza utilized three well-established proxies for 
overvaluation:  high discretionary accruals, high net equity issuances, and price 
momentum.  See id. at 4-5 (discussing why these metrics are fair proxies for 
overvaluation).  Adjusting for investment opportunities, the authors found “a 
positive relation between all of these three mispricing proxies and firm investment.”  
Id. at 5.
195 Id. at 6 (“We find that firms with high (low) investment have low (high) stock 
returns, after controlling for investment opportunities and other characteristics 
leading to return predictability.”).
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That finding is consistent with the authors’ theory that managers evaluate 
project proposals according to current stock price levels.196  If, indeed, they 
do so, then overvaluation will lead to further investor loss by causing 
managers to overestimate the value of proposed projects.  
The “stickiness” of a growth strategy. Acquisitions and internal 
investments represent “growth” strategies for firms.  Recent research 
suggests that once corporate managers set a firm on this sort of growth 
course, that course can be difficult to reverse, and value-destruction may 
result.197 Professors Philippe Aghion and Jeremy Stein observe that 
constraints on firms’ resources, particularly on managers’ time, force firms 
to decide between increasing sales growth (i.e., pursuing a growth strategy) 
and improving profit margins (by, for example, lowering per unit costs).198
Investors, then, evaluate the firm’s performance and prospects according to 
whether its managers have chosen a growth or margins strategy, altering 
their performance measures depending on the strategy management has 
selected.199  In particular, if the market believes a firm is pursuing a growth 
strategy, its valuation will tend to put more weight on realized growth.  That 
will, in turn, encourage managers to stick with the growth strategy so as to 
avoid disappointing the market.  Only when the growth strategy becomes 
severely inefficient will managers shift to a cost-cutting strategy.200  Thus, 
decisions to pursue growth strategies are “sticky.”  Managers who adopt 
such strategies in an attempt to bolster stock price or keep an inflated stock 
price from declining will tend to pursue such strategies too long – i.e., to the 
point at which they are sacrificing firm value.
Avoidance of positive NPV projects . In addition to causing active value 
destruction through unwise acquisitions and greenfield investments, 
196 See supra note 193.  Of course, it is also consistent with managers’ acting in a 
consciously opportunistic fashion and pursuing projects they believe to have a 
negative NPV simply because such projects promise them personal benefits.
197
 Philippe Aghion & Jeremy C. Stein, Growth vs. Margins:  Destabilizing 
Consequences of Giving the Stock Market What It Wants (Dec. 5, 2004), NBER 
Working Paper No. W10999 (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=637496).
198 Id. at 1 (“[D]oing more on one dimension [i.e., either growth or margins] 
necessarily implies doing less on the other.”).  Other scholars have similarly 
recognized that managers face this sort of “multi-tasking” problem.  See, e.g., Bengt 
Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses:  Incentive 
Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991).
199
 Aghion & Stein, supra note 197, at 1 (citing Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, 
Simple Forecasts and Paradigm Shifts, Harv. Univ. Working Paper (2004) 
(demonstrating how this sort of emphasis shift occurred in analysts’ reports on 
Amazon.com)).
200 Id. at 2-3.
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overvaluation may cause passive value destruction by encouraging 
managers to forego positive NPV projects.  Because the dominant strategy 
of managers of overvalued firms is, in the words of Professor Jensen, to 
“postpone the day of reckoning until [they] are gone or [they] figure out 
how to resolve the issue,”201 they will look for opportunities to conceal their 
firm’s overvaluation from the market.  One way to do so is to delay 
investment expenditures in order to meet quarterly earnings expectations
and avoid the value reassessment that accompanies missing such an 
expectation.202  Accordingly, many managers will delay positive NPV 
investments – even where such a delay entails a sacrifice in firm value – in 
an attempt to dupe the market.  
Recent research suggests that this sort of value-sacrificing behavior is 
widespread.  In their 2004 survey of 401 corporate CFOs, Professors John 
R. Graham, Campbell Harvey, and Shivaram Rajgopal posed the following 
question:  “Near the end of the quarter, it looks like your company might 
come in below the desired earnings target.  Within what is permitted by 
GAAP, which of the following choices might your company make?”203
Eighty percent of respondents stated that their companies would be willing 
to delay discretionary expenditures on research and development, 
advertising, and maintenance, and over 55 percent stated that their company 
would “[d]elay starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice in 
value.”204 Overvaluation thus tends to cause passive value destruction as 
managers attempt to buy time by delaying positive NPV investments.
(iii) Eventual Fraud
Once managers of overvalued firms have exhausted their opportunities to 
boost or maintain apparent firm value through acquisitions and greenfield 
investments, they face a temptation to pursue more direct means of duping 
the market. They may begin with “earnings management,” the well-accepted 
practice of smoothing earnings by strategically timing the recognition of 
201
 Jensen, supra note 1, at 10.  See also supra notes 155 - 159 and accompanying 
text (discussing objectives of managers of overvalued firms).
202 See supra notes 156 - 157 and accompanying text (discussing stock price effects 
of earnings surprises). 
203
 John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, The Economic 
Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting at Table 6 (available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=491627).   
204 Id.  Around 40 percent of respondents stated that they would “[b]ook revenues 
now rather than next quarter (if justified in either quarter).”  Id.  This result is 
consistent with the view that earnings management is being used to dupe the market 
to prevent discovery of overvaluation.  See infra notes 205 - 207 and accompanying 
text.
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revenues and expenses in order to meet market projections.205 Indeed, 
around 40 percent of the CFOs surveyed by Professors Graham, Harvey, and 
Rajgopal reported that they would “book revenues now rather than next 
quarter” if their company were in danger of missing an earnings target.206
Some scholars have argued that earnings management is itself fraudulent.207
Even if it is not, though, it tends to evolve rapidly into outright fraud, for 
managers who recognize revenues early and push recognition of expenses 
into the future will face more difficult accounting challenges in subsequent 
quarters and will eventually have no choice but to lie or have their company
be discovered as overvalued.208
It should be obvious that accounting manipulation will create significant 
agency costs for a firm.  In the likely event that a firm’s accounting 
manipulations are revealed, the firm’s reputation for honesty and candor will 
be damaged.  Such a reputation is, of course, essential to a successful firm:  
When a company’s managers are less than forthright, customers will be less 
willing to do business with the firm; compliance costs will rise as regulators 
monitor the firm more closely; potential business partners will be less 
willing to embark on joint ventures; lenders will be less likely to extend 
credit on favorable terms; and investors will invest their money elsewhere 
(or demand a higher return on investment).  Accounting manipulations thus 
make it hard for a company to flourish and, in extreme cases, may kill the 
company altogether.209  Thus, the agency costs created by accounting 
205 See Jensen, supra note 1, at 7-8 (describing earnings management and noting that 
it “has been considered an integral part of every top manager’s job for at least the 
last two decades”).
206
 Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, supra note 203, at Table 6.
207
 For example, Professor Jensen argues:
[W]hen managers smooth earnings to meet market projections, 
they’re not creating value for the firm; they’re both lying and 
making poor decisions that destroy value.  . . . [W]hen numbers 
are manipulated to tell the markets what they want to hear (or 
what managers want them to hear) rather than the true status of 
the firm—it is lying, and when real operating decisions that would 
maximize value are compromised to meet market expectations 
real long-term value is being destroyed.
Jensen, supra note 1, at 8.
208
 Id. (“Revenues borrowed from the future and today’s expenses pushed to 
tomorrow require even more manipulation in the future to forestall the day of 
reckoning.”).  
209
 Enron represents perhaps the most striking recent example of this process.  See 
generally McLean & Elkind, supra note 99; MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, 
POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2003).  Valued at 
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manipulation, which overvalued equity encourages as a means of buying 
time, are potentially huge. 
c. Greater Reliance Costs
In addition to imposing greater agency costs than undervaluation, equity 
overvaluation is likely to cause investors to suffer greater “reliance” losses.  
To see this point, consider two hypothetical cases of misrepresentation.210
In one case, a credible source informs the victim (Victim A) that her savings 
are worth 25% less than they are actually worth.  In the second, the victim 
(Victim B) is told that her savings are worth 25% more than they actually 
are.  In both cases, the truth is revealed one year after the misrepresentation 
is made.  Who is likely to suffer greater damages—Victim A or Victim B?
To answer this question, consider the two victims’ likely courses of 
action.  Victim A, misinformed that her savings are undervalued, will likely 
save more (i.e., divert income from current consumption to savings), and/or 
move her invested funds, which she believes are not adequately 
appreciating, into what she deems to be the next best investments.211  Her 
its peak at around $70 billion, Enron was actually worth around $30 billion – still a 
significant amount by anyone’s standards.  Jensen, supra note 1, at 10-11.  Through 
accounting manipulations aimed at disguising this degree of overvaluation, 
however, Enron’s managers impaired the company’s reputation and, in the process, 
destroyed its value.  Id. at 11.  As Professor Jensen explains:
[S]enior managers’ efforts to defend the $40 billion of excess 
valuation (which was a mistake that was going to go away 
anyway) effectively destroyed the $30 billion core value.  … 
[Enron’s managers] destroyed [the company] by trying to fool the 
markets through accounting manipulations, hiding debt through 
off-balance sheet partnerships, and over hyped new ventures such 
as their broadband futures effort.  In doing this, Enron’s managers 
gambled with their critical asset – Enron’s reputation for integrity. 
Id.
210
 The misrepresentation could be either fraud or negligent misrepresentation.
211
 Above minimal income levels, individuals tend not to spend their entire incomes 
on immediate consumption; instead, they set a portion aside in the form of savings 
to pay for future consumption.  See Stout, supra note 46, at 682.  In allocating their 
income, they attempt to achieve an optimal balance between present and future 
consumption.  Their decisions regarding how much to save and where to invest are 
influenced by their current investment portfolio.  Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 
NYU L. REV. 761, 767 (1985) (observing that “[c]apital markets facilitate 
individual planning of consumption over time in light of anticipated resources” and 
that they “guide investment and saving decisions through prices”).  If an investor 
believes his portfolio is worth less than it is, he’ll tend to divert too much money 
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damage occasioned by the misrepresentation will thus consist of (1) her net 
utility loss from foregoing current consumption to save instead, plus (2) the 
difference between her “second best” investment returns and the returns she 
would have received had she not moved her invested funds.  Victim B, led 
to believe that she’s richer than she really is, will likely save less and 
consume more.  If her impressive returns lead her to save more, she will 
likely invest in the same investments currently in her purportedly, but not 
actually, high-performing portfolio.  Indeed, this pattern of increased 
consumption and re-investment in apparently appreciating enterprises 
occurred all too often during the technology bubble of the late 1990s.
While it is impossible to say, without more facts, whether Victim A or 
Victim B is hurt to a greater degree, the stronger intuition seems to be that 
Victim B (the one misinformed that her savings were worth more than they 
are) would probably suffer greater harm in the long run.  Individuals 
normally allocate their resources according to expected marginal utility.  
Their first resources are devoted to basic necessities (e.g., food and shelter), 
then they typically save for the future, then whatever is left over is spent on 
luxuries (e.g., consumption of non-necessities, charitable contributions, 
etc.).212  As they move from necessities to luxuries, their expenditures tend 
to produce less incremental utility.  A person who is misinformed that she’s 
wealthier than she really is will tend to shift from investment spending to 
luxury spending too quickly, thereby allocating her resources in a manner 
that fails to maximize her expected utility. It thus appears that the reliance 
losses occasioned by equity overvaluation (a misrepresentation that one is 
richer than one really is), are greater than those occasioned by equity 
undervaluation.  Investors may therefore place a premium on corporate 
policies that reduce the risk of overvaluation.
d. Greater Impairment of Stock Price as a 
Managerial Monitoring Tool
Corporate managers who fail to increase firm value frequently are, and 
should be, replaced.  The decision to replace incumbent managers is 
generally initiated by the board of directors or by large shareholders (e.g., 
institutional investors).  Because information regarding the performance of 
toward savings and away from current consumption.  He may also divert money 
from the undervalued security into other investments.  If the investor believes his 
portfolio is worth more than it is, he’ll tend to divert money away from savings and 
toward current consumption.  See id. at 767-68.  But see Stout, supra note 46, at 
682-84 (arguing that efficient securities prices are not that important to investors 
deciding how to allocate their money).  
212 Cf. Stout, supra note 46, at 682 (discussing how individuals tend to allocate 
financial resources as their income grows).
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managers is costly to obtain (particularly in large enterprises in which the 
relevant information is possessed by numerous employees scattered 
throughout the firm),213 directors and large shareholders rationally seek out 
proxies for managerial performance.  Stock price reflects the discounted 
present value of the firm’s future cash flows214 and is therefore a good, 
though admittedly imperfect, proxy.215
Stock mispricing obviously thwarts the effectiveness of this monitoring 
tool.216  If stock is undervalued, directors and institutional shareholders will 
be too quick to replace incumbent management, and if stock is overvalued, 
directors and large shareholders may fail to seek replacement when they 
ought to do so.  Both forms of mispricing therefore increase the difficulty of
monitoring managers.
But the degree to which mispricing thwarts effective managerial 
monitoring is likely to be greater when stocks are mispriced upward than 
when the mispricing is in a downward direction.  If the directors of a 
corporation decide to replace an incumbent manager upon observing a stock 
price that appears to be too low, the manager can plead her case to the 
board, explaining why the stock price is temporarily depressed and will 
eventually rebound.  If, for example, management is concealing price-
enhancing information for strategic purposes (as in SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur), the manager will generally explain that fact to the board or 
institutional investors.217  Thus, the board and institutional investors are 
likely to learn of mispricing in a downward direction before they make a 
poor staffing decision.  On the other hand, if the stock is overvalued because 
of undisclosed information, there will likely be no opportunity for the 
213
 See Manne, supra note 25, at 14-16; Bainbridge, supra note 83, at 1013-14.
214
 Brealey & Myers, supra note 41, at 59-62.
215
 A falling stock price does not, of course, necessarily signal poor management.  
Nor does a rising stock price signal good management.  Even a rising stock price 
may signal poor management if the price is rising more slowly than the stock price 
of similarly situated benchmark firms, and a falling stock price may signal good 
management if the rate of decrease is slower than that of benchmark firms.
216 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 867 (“[A]ccurately priced securities will 
enable firms to observe more accurately when corporate managers are successful.  
Thus, markets for managerial services and for corporate control will function more 
effectively.”).
217
 In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 
(1968) (discussed infra at notes 219- 222, 307 - 310 and accompanying text), a 
mining company that had discovered a valuable ore deposit attempted to keep its 
stock price depressed (i.e., at a level not reflecting the ore discovery) so that it could 
buy up surrounding land and mineral rights without tipping off current owners of 
those lands and rights.  Id. at 843.
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directors or institutional investors to learn of this fact (management is 
unlikely to volunteer the information), and they may thus fail to replace 
managers who really ought to be replaced.  In other words, identification of 
mispricing within the boardroom is much less likely to occur if the price is 
too high than if it is too low, and overvaluation is therefore more likely than 
undervaluation to reduce the efficacy of stock price as a low-cost tool for 
monitoring managers.
B. Lower Costs From Price-Decreasing Insider Trading
The previous subpart demonstrated that PDIT provides greater benefits 
to investors than PEIT. This subpart examines the cost side of the balance, 
concluding that the investor costs occasioned by PDIT are likely to be lower 
than those caused by PEIT.      
1. Less Likely to Thwart Corporate Opportunities
PDIT is less likely than PEIT to cause what is perhaps the most 
important type of corporate harm occasioned by insider trading:  the
thwarting of value-enhancing corporate transactions that could otherwise be 
accomplished.218 To see this point, consider why PEIT might prevent such 
transactions from occurring and why PDIT generally could not do so.
PEIT may injure a corporation seeking to take advantage of non-public
information regarding an asset’s hidden value.  Suppose, for example, that 
managers are aware that some asset the corporation seeks to acquire is 
undervalued and, if purchased by the corporation, would enhance corporate 
value.219  The law generally permits an asset buyer who has discovered 
information regarding an asset’s hidden value to refrain from disclosing that 
information,220 and the corporation will thus want to keep such information 
218 See generally Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 600-02 (discussing how insider 
trading could thwart value-creating corporate transactions).
219
 The classic case involving this sort of fact pattern is Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 
F.2d 833, in which geologists from a mining company had discovered a valuable 
ore deposit.  Managers knew that the value of the company would be substantially 
enhanced if it could acquire land and mineral rights from neighbors at a favorable 
price.  
220 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b), cmt. d (“A buyer of 
property…is not ordinarily expected to disclose circumstances that make the 
property more valuable than the seller supposes.”).  Professor Anthony Kronman 
explains why this is so:
By and large, the cases requiring disclosure involve information 
which is likely to have been casually acquired….  The cases 
permitting nondisclosure, on the other hand, involve information 
which, on the whole, is likely to have been deliberately produced.  
53
a secret in order to prevent the asset’s price from rising.221  If managers who 
are aware of the corporation’s forthcoming asset purchase attempt to profit
personally by purchasing their corporation’s own stock, their trading may 
cause an increase in the corporation’s stock price.222  That price activity may 
then cause the current owner of the asset not to sell or to demand a higher 
price.  PEIT, then, would squander an otherwise available corporate 
opportunity.223  While such insider trading would appear to be a violation of 
the insiders’ fiduciary duties, regardless of the law on insider trading,224 the 
insider trading prohibition does act as a prophylactic bar to this sort of 
corporate harm.
With respect to PDIT, by contrast, it is difficult to see how such trading 
could thwart a value-creating corporate transaction that could otherwise be
Taken as a group, the disclosure cases give at least the appearance 
of promoting allocative efficiency by limiting the assignment of 
property rights to those types of information which are likely to be 
the fruit of a deliberate investment (either in the development of 
expertise or in actual searching).
Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1978).  Because the information regarding the hidden value 
of an asset the corporation would like to acquire is likely to have been “deliberately 
produced,” the corporation will generally have the right to refrain from disclosing 
such information prior to purchase. 
221
 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, for example, the company president specifically ordered 
insiders to keep the discovery at issue a secret so as not to tip off neighboring 
landowners.  Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 843.
222
 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, for example, the stock price rose substantially following 
unauthorized insider trading (from 20 7/8 when chemical assay results proved the 
discovery to around 37 when the discovery was publicly announced).  Id. at 847.
223
 PEIT could also thwart value-creating acquisitions of other businesses.  As 
Professor Bainbridge explains:
If managers charged with overseeing an acquisition buy shares in 
the target, and their trading has a significant upward effect on the 
price of the target’s stock, the takeover will be more expensive.  If 
significant price and volume changes are caused by their trading, 
that also might tip off others to the secret, interfering with the 
bidder’s plans, as by alerting the target to the need for defensive 
measures.
Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 600.
224 See Todd A. Bauman, Insider Trading at Common Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 838, 
863-64 & n. 114 (1984) (“[I]f a manager actually harms his corporation through a 
particular insider-trading transaction, he should be liable to his firm for a breach of 
his duty of care, even if it is determined that insider trading in general does not 
violate a manager’s duty of loyalty”).
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legally accomplished.  The relevant situation would be one in which the 
corporation had an interest in keeping its stock’s price inflated above its true 
value in order to accomplish some transaction. For example, the corporation 
might desire to use its overvalued stock as consideration for a purchase, to 
issue new equity at an inflated price, or to secure credit on favorable terms.  
But it probably could not do so.  If insiders were aware of information 
indicating that the stock was overvalued but refrained from disclosing that 
information, any stock price-dependent transaction entered into during the 
period of inflation would likely be voidable by the corporation’s counter-
party.225  Thus, corporate transactions that would be thwarted by PDIT 
probably could not be legally accomplished in any event.
There is, in short, an asymmetry in the law regarding pre-contract 
disclosures, and that asymmetry causes PEIT to be more value-destructive 
than PDIT.  Because a corporation generally need not disclose information 
about hidden value before transacting on the basis of that information, it 
may legitimately keep such information a secret.226  PEIT may prevent it 
from doing so and may thereby thwart value-creating transactions.
Information suggesting that the corporation is overvalued, however, must 
generally be disclosed.227  Accordingly, PDIT would not reveal any 
corporate secrets that would not otherwise have to be revealed.  It is 
therefore less likely than PEIT to squander legitimate corporate 
opportunities.
225 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 164 (permitting rescission 
of contract by party who is victim of fraudulent or material misrepresentation); 
161(b) (stating circumstances under which failure to disclose negative information 
may give rise to right to void contract).
226 See id. at § 161(b), cmt. d (observing that, while “[a] buyer of property … is not 
ordinarily expected to disclose circumstances that make the property more valuable 
than the seller supposes,” he is “ordinarily expected to disclose a known latent 
defect of quality or title that is of such a character as would probably prevent the 
buyer from buying at the contract price”); Kronman, supra note 220, at 18 (arguing 
that deliberately produced information regarding hidden value need not be disclosed 
prior to contracting).
227 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (non-disclosure of a fact 
is fraudulent and renders a contract voidable where the non-disclosing party “knows 
that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic 
assumption on which that party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the 
fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable 
standards of fair dealing”).
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2. Less Likely to Infringe Corporate Property Rights
Some scholars who are skeptical of most claims that insider trading 
harms investors and society in general defend the insider trading prohibition
(some version of it, at least) on grounds that it protects corporations’ 
property rights to information regarding their business and prospects.228
Professor Stephen Bainbridge, for example, discounts most of the standard 
arguments that insider trading is harmful229 but nonetheless concludes that 
the insider trading prohibition is justifiable “as a means of protecting 
property rights in information.”230  Bainbridge and other “propertarians” 
explain that assigning the corporation a property right in information 
regarding firm prospects, and protecting that right by banning trading by 
insiders on the basis of that information, protects the firm’s economic 
incentive to produce socially valuable information.231 Bainbridge admits 
that property protection is not as crucial here as it is with more standard 
forms of intellectual property (e.g., patents and trade secrets), for firm 
managers may be motivated to produce socially valuable information 
regarding the corporation’s prospects even if that information does not 
228 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 598-607; Macey, supra note 24; 
Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 313.
229 See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 592-98 (discounting pro-regulation arguments 
other than those related to protection of firm’s property rights).
230
 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 791.
231 See id. at 599 (“The rationale for prohibiting insider trading is the same as that 
for prohibiting patent infringement or theft of trade secrets: protecting the economic 
incentive to produce socially valuable information.”); Macey, supra note 24, at 30 
(“Legal rules should be developed that ensure the optimal production of 
information.  Analysis of how optimal production might be achieved is best seen by 
viewing inside information as a form of property interest.”); Easterbrook, supra
note 18, at 313 (explaining how property protection may be necessary to preserve 
incentives to create information).  See also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 
(2d Cir. 1991), in which Judge Winter rationalized the federal insider trading ban as 
follows:
Information is perhaps the most precious commodity in 
commercial markets.  It is expensive to produce, and, because it 
involves facts and ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried 
in one’s head, there is a ubiquitous risk that those who pay to 
produce information will see others reap the profit from it.  Where 
the profit from an activity is likely to be diverted, investment in 
that activity will decline.  If the law fails to protect property rights 
in commercial information, therefore, less will be invested in 
generating such information.  
Id. at 576-77 (Winter, J., dissenting).
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receive property protection.232  Nonetheless, he argues, “[t]here is no 
avoiding the necessity of assigning a property interest in the information to 
either the corporation or the insider,”233 and, because assignment of the right 
to the corporation is likely to have some positive incentive effect at the 
margin,234 the right ought to be assigned to the corporation.235  The argument 
for assigning the right to insiders, Bainbridge argues, is “considerably 
weaker.”236  He says that “[t]he only plausible reason for doing so is the 
argument that legalized insider trading would be an appropriate 
compensation scheme.”237 In sum, the propertarians reason that because the 
incentive benefits of assigning the right to the corporation would likely 
exceed any benefits from providing insiders with compensation in the form 
of legal insider trading, the right to inside information ought to be given to 
the corporation. 
This analysis assumes, though, that positive inside information (i.e.,
“good news” suggesting that the corporation is undervalued) and negative 
inside information (i.e., “bad news” suggesting that the corporation is 
overvalued) should be treated the same.238  In actuality, there are good 
reasons to afford different treatment to the two types of information. To see 
232
 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 604 (conceding that “[f]rom the corporation’s 
perspective, … legalizing insider trading would have a relatively small effect on the 
firm’s incentive to develop new information”).  See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in 
the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 488-90 (2001) (arguing that firm 
managers would create the socially valuable information purportedly protected by 
the insider trading ban even if the corporation did not “own” the “right” to that 
information).
233
 Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 604.
234 Id. (“As with other property rights, the law . . . should simply assume (although 
the assumption will sometimes be wrong) that assigning the property right to agent-
produced information to the firm maximizes the social incentives for the production 
of valuable new information.”).
235 Id. (“In some cases, however, insider trading will harm the corporation’s 
interests and thus adversely affect its incentives in this regard [i.e., to develop new, 
socially beneficial information].  This argues for assigning the property right to the 
corporation, rather than the insider.”).
236 Id.
237 Id.  See supra notes 28 - 31 and accompanying text (discussing argument that 
insider trading may provide efficient compensation mechanism).
238
 It also appears to assume that the right should not be transferable from the 
corporation to insiders, a point that many propertarians fiercely contest.  See supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
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this point, consider (1) why the law creates rights to information and (2) 
how it ought to go about assigning those rights.  
The creation of a right to information should be based upon the extent to 
which creation of the right would enhance incentives to produce the 
information at issue; the more likely it is that property protection would 
enhance those incentives, the more appropriate it is for the law to recognize 
such a right.239 This observation suggests that property status is more 
appropriately afforded to positive inside information than to negative inside 
information.  “Good news” is, to a large degree, deliberately created by the 
corporation’s agents as they perpetually work to cut costs, increase 
revenues, and expand markets.  “Bad news,” on the other hand, tends simply 
to happen.  Because there generally is less deliberate effort involved in 
creating negative inside information, there is less need for property 
protection at all.  While it may be desirable to create incentives to discover
negative inside information (as when an enterprising manager investigates 
consumer demand for his firm’s new or proposed product and discovers that 
it is softer than expected, or when a mid-level accountant scrutinizes records 
to discover that her peers are fudging the numbers to make the firm appear 
more profitable than it really is), there is no need to provide incentives to 
create the underlying facts.  With respect to positive inside information, on 
the other hand, the law should encourage both the discovery and the creation 
of the underlying facts.240  Thus, the case for affording property status to 
inside information is stronger for positive inside information than for 
negative inside information, though it still might be desirable to recognize 
property rights to negative inside information so as to encourage its 
discovery.  
The more important consideration, though, is the question of 
assignment.  Assuming there are good reasons for affording property status 
to both positive and negative inside information, should the rights to both 
sorts of information be assigned to the same party?  Probably not.  Investors 
would be best off if the right to information regarding corporate affairs were 
assigned to the corporate constituent most likely to use it to maximize firm 
value:  If giving the right to the information to the corporation and denying 
insiders a right to use it would maximize firm value, then the corporation 
ought to get the right; if instead firm value would be maximized by giving 
239 See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 599; Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 313-14.
240
 Note, though, that the case for property rights in positive inside information still 
is not as strong as the case for traditional forms of intellectual property, for 
managers are generally motivated to create good news even without property 
protection.  See Krawiec, supra note 232, at 489 (“Issuers create valuable 
information about themselves to operate a successful business enterprise, not to 
generate trading profits.”).
58
the right to corporate agents, then investors would prefer that the right be 
distributed accordingly.241  There are good reasons to believe that the 
corporation is most likely to maximize the value of positive inside 
information, but that corporate agents acting in their individual capacities
are more likely to maximize the value of negative inside information.
First consider positive inside information.  As noted, it is often the case 
that a value-enhancing corporate opportunity will be available only if the 
firm is able to enter into contracts that would be thwarted (or would be 
possible only on less favorable terms) by insider trades.242 If the good news 
regarding the corporate opportunity were exploitable by insiders, the 
opportunity and the corporate value created thereby would not be available 
to the firm.  Accordingly, value would be maximized by giving the firm the 
right to positive inside information.
With regard to negative inside information, by contrast, employees are 
more likely to be the value-maximizers.  If the corporation “owns” bad 
news, corporate managers will likely suppress the news to the extent they 
are permitted to do so under the securities laws,243 leading to a period of 
overvaluation and the costs that accompany such mispricing.244  This period 
of overvaluation, unlike the period of undervaluation that will occur if 
241
 One can imagine a hypothetical bargain among investors and managers over how 
the rights to positive and negative inside information should be allocated.  The party 
that could create the most value from the information would, assuming it could 
capture that value for itself because the information’s benefits accrued to it naturally 
or could be “sold” to those it benefited, be willing to “pay” the most for the 
information.  (The corporation would “pay” by providing a higher wage to 
employees in exchange for their forbearance from using the information; the 
employees would “pay” by demanding lower wages.)  In any event, the party 
valuing the information the most would likely end up with it.  See generally Ronald 
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960).  The law, then, ought 
to initially assign the right to the party most likely to create the most value from the 
information – the ultimate “buyer” in the hypothetical bargain.   
242
 Insider trades would signal the firm’s contracting partner to refrain from 
executing the deal or to demand more favorable terms.  See supra notes 219 - 224
and accompanying text.
243
 Bad news need not be disclosed absent some affirmative disclosure requirement, 
such as one of the requirements imposed by the laws mandating periodic 
disclosures.  See, e.g., Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (“We do not have a system of continuous disclosure. Instead firms 
are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) unless positive law 
creates a duty to disclose.”).  This means corporate managers will often be free to sit 
on bad news and allow overvaluation to persist (and increase in magnitude).
244 See supra notes 148 - 209 and accompanying text (discussing agency costs 
resulting from overvaluation).
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managers suppress good news in order to pursue a corporate opportunity 
that might otherwise be thwarted,245 will not result in the creation of any 
lasting value for the corporation.  Thus, if the negative information is owned 
by the corporation, it is not likely to be used in a way that enhances investor 
wealth in a non-transitory fashion.  If instead corporate employees own the 
bad news they discover, they are likely to trade on it, pushing the 
corporation’s stock price toward actual value.246  This salutary effect on 
price will alleviate the investor harms associated with equity overvaluation 
(e.g., agency costs) and will benefit society as a whole (not just investors) 
by enhancing allocative efficiency.   
In sum, the optimal allocation of property rights in inside information 
regarding firm prospects – i.e., the allocation corporate agents and investors 
would agree to in a hypothetical bargain247 – would likely assign the right to 
positive inside information to the corporation, while allocating the right to 
negative inside information to corporate insiders. Thus, PDIT, unlike PEIT, 
would not infringe upon the corporation’s right to information concerning 
firm prospects.
3. Less Likely to Dissuade Investors
A corporation’s liberalization of insider trading might dissuade potential 
stockholders from investing in that corporation. Investors may be dissuaded 
by concerns about firm value (i.e., they may perceive that a liberalized 
insider trading policy will result in management decisions that lower the 
firm’s fundamental value),248 or they may steer clear of the firm out of 
concern that they could end up trading stock with an insider possessing an 
informational advantage.  It is likely, though, that investors would be less 
dissuaded by an asymmetric policy that liberalized PDIT but generally 
banned PEIT than by all-or-nothing policies that either permitted or banned 
all insider trading.
To see this point, consider the decision calculus facing an investor 
deciding among investments in three firms that are identical except for their 
insider trading policies.  Suppose that Firm A bans all insider trading, Firm 
B permits all insider trading, and Firm C permits PDIT (at least, if it is 
245 See supra notes 219 - 223 and accompanying text.
246 See infra notes 260 - 287 and accompanying text (explaining why agents are 
likely to engage in PDIT if permitted to do so).
247 See supra note 241.
248 See supra note 14 and accompanying text and infra notes 289 - 290 and 
accompanying text (discussing potential mismanagement occasioned by a 
liberalized insider trading policy).
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disclosed)249 while generally banning PEIT.  With respect to Firm A (no 
insider trading allowed), the investor would take comfort in the fact that she 
would not be purchasing stock from an insider with superior information, 
but she would worry that the stock might be currently overvalued or that it 
might become substantially overvalued, leading to increased agency costs 
and a potential crash.250  With respect to Firm B (all insider trading 
allowed), the investor would not be concerned about significant 
overvaluation (insider trading would prevent such mispricing),251 but she 
might worry that the liberalized insider trading policy could result in 
insiders’ squandering corporate opportunities, thereby reducing long-term 
firm value.252  With respect to Firm C (only PDIT allowed), the investor 
would take comfort in the fact that the stock is unlikely to be overvalued,253
and she would not worry about insiders’ squandering otherwise available 
corporate opportunities.254  While she would run the risk that she might be 
buying from an insider possessing an informational advantage, she would 
not be particularly concerned, for the extent of overvaluation likely would 
not be great.255  Moreover, for reasons discussed below, any concerns about 
corporate mismanagement would be allayed by a corporate policy requiring 
PDIT to be immediately disclosed.256  Thus, of the three possible insider 
trading policies, a policy authorizing PDIT, but not PEIT, seems least likely 
to dissuade potential investors.
249
 For reasons discussed below, a firm adopting a policy liberalizing PDIT would 
likely require that such trading be disclosed at the time of execution.  See infra notes 
260 - 280 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 132 - 215 and accompanying text (discussing overvaluation’s 
effect on agency costs and reliance costs).
251
 As explained below, disclosed PDIT would prevent stock price overvaluation by 
“derivatively informing” the market that those closest to the business believed it to 
be overvalued.  See infra notes 261 - 280 and accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 219 - 224 and accompanying text (explaining how PEIT may 
squander corporate opportunities).
253 See infra notes 261 - 280 and accompanying text (explaining why disclosed 
PDIT will prevent overvaluation).
254 See supra notes 225 - 227 and accompanying text (explaining why PDIT, unlike 
PEIT, would not thwart otherwise available corporate opportunities).
255 See infra notes 285 - 288 and accompanying text (explaining how liberalized 
PDIT essentially creates a “bounty” for the first insider to “report” overvaluation, 
thereby preventing companies from becoming significantly overvalued). 
256 See infra notes 289 - 296 and accompanying text (explaining how disclosure 
requirement could alleviate concerns about mismanagement occasioned by 
liberalized PDIT).
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C. Synthesis:  An Asymmetric Insider Trading Policy as 
Majoritarian Default
So far, we have seen that:  (1) undervaluation is more likely to be self-
correcting (even without insider trading) than overvaluation;257 (2) in the 
long-run, undervaluation is unlikely to impose significant costs on investors, 
while overvaluation is likely to do so;258 and (3) whereas insider trading that 
pushes a stock’s price upward toward actual value may cause harm to the 
corporation and its investors, insider trading that pushes an inflated price 
downward toward value is unlikely to do so.259  Taken together, these 
observations suggest that an asymmetric insider trading policy that permits 
some form of PDIT, while generally banning PEIT, is the policy investors 
and managers would likely bargain for were they able (practically and 
legally) to do so.  In other words, an asymmetric insider trading policy that 
liberalizes only PDIT likely represents the “majoritarian default policy.”    
But that’s the easy part.  As with so many policy proposals, the devil is 
in the details.  Specifically, how would corporations structure a liberalized 
PDIT policy so as to maximize PDIT’s salutary effect on stock price?  
Would corporate insiders engage in PDIT if they were legally permitted to 
do so?  And would a policy liberalizing PDIT encourage mismanagement 
and/or hinder the flow of negative information within the corporation?  The 
following discussion outlines the sort of liberalized PDIT policy 
corporations would likely adopt (Part II.C.1) and addresses potential 
problems such a policy might create (Part II.C.2).
1. The Design of the Default Policy:  Disclosed PDIT 
Permitted
The fundamental objective of a liberalized PDIT policy would be to 
harness insider trading’s power to drive stock prices toward their 
fundamental value.260  Accordingly, structuring an effective PDIT policy 
requires consideration of the mechanisms by which insider trading leads to 
more accurate securities prices.  Insider trading has its price-correcting 
257 See supra Part II.A.1. (explaining why managers and analysts are more likely to 
correct undervaluation than overvaluation).
258 See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining why overvaluation is more likely to cause 
significant investor harm than undervaluation).
259 See supra Part II.B (discussing how PEIT is more likely than PDIT to squander 
corporate opportunities, infringe upon corporate property rights to information, and 
dissuade potential investors).
260
 As discussed above, there is near consensus among economists that insider 
trading pushes a stock’s market price toward its fundamental value.  See supra note 
25 and accompanying text.    
62
effect because it conveys a valuable piece of information: that those closest 
to the company and most informed about its operations believe it to be either 
undervalued (in the case of insider purchases) or overvalued (in the case of 
insider sales).261  Armed with that information, investors who are not privy 
to the actual facts motivating the insider transactions will nonetheless follow 
the lead of the insiders by buying or selling the stock or adjusting their 
reservation prices (i.e., the amount they would be willing to pay to obtain 
the stock or would require to give it up).262  As a result of this process, the 
market price of the stock will change to reflect the information conveyed by 
insider trades and, because insiders are the individuals best-informed about 
the company’s true prospects, will become more accurate.263
As Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman famously 
explained, there are actually two mechanisms by which insider trading may 
“derivatively inform” traders of stock mispricing (and thereby promote
price-correction).264  First, investors may engage in “trade decoding” 
whereby they deduce binary information regarding a firm’s prospects (i.e., 
261 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 629-30 (explaining why insider 
trading will tend to push stock prices in the right direction).      
262 See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading 
Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 324 (1998) (explaining 
how investors follow the lead of insiders in determining how to value a stock and 
where to invest their money).
263
 It is important to recognize that insider trading’s salutary price effect results from 
the information such trading conveys, not from the fact that the trading alters the 
supply of or demand for the security at issue.  The supply effect of insider trading 
could not be responsible for the price changes it causes because the relevant supply 
at issue is not the particular security being traded but is instead the risk-reward 
combination offered by that security and a host of others and is thus so vast that any 
increased or reduced demand by insiders would be too small to affect price.  See 
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 630 (noting that because “the relevant supply 
for purposes of determining the impact of insider trading is not the ‘float’ of the 
particular security, but rather the total of all other investment opportunities with a 
similar relationship between risk and return,” the supply change occasioned by 
insider trading “is simply too small to have any but a transitory, and probably 
insignificant, impact on the price of the security”); R. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 35-44 (2d ed. 1983) (making similar 
point); Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, 
and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 335-36 (making 
similar point).  
264
 The trading and reservation price-adjustment that occurs following insider trades 
is “derivatively informed,” for it is based on information inferred from facts related 
to the trading of others.  See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 572-79 
(describing derivatively informed trading).
63
that they are either improving or worsening) from insiders’ trades.265  The 
problem with trade decoding, Professors Gilson and Kraakman argued, is 
that “uninformed traders must be able to identify informed traders 
individually and observe their trading activities directly,”266 and they are 
somewhat limited in their ability to do so because not all trades by insiders 
must be disclosed to the market, and those that must be disclosed need not 
be disclosed immediately.267  Non-insiders may also engage in “price 
decoding,” whereby they observe a price change occasioned by insider 
trading of a sufficient volume, compare the price change to the public 
information concerning the firm’s prospects, and infer what possible new 
information would successfully explain observed price changes.268
Trade decoding and price decoding differ in terms of their preconditions 
(i.e., what is required in order for each to occur?) and their effects (i.e., what 
information does each convey?).  With respect to preconditions, trade 
decoding requires some identification of insider trades,269 while price 
decoding does not require such identification270 but instead requires trading 
of a quantity sufficient to cause some sort of change in price or observable 
trading volume.271  With respect to the level of information provided, trade 
decoding reveals only whether a firm’s prospects are improving or 
declining, whereas price-decoding provides information regarding why the 
firm’s prospects are changing.272
In light of these differences, trade decoding is more likely to be the 
means by which insider trading would reduce the price of overvalued 
265 Id. at 573 (“Trade decoding occurs whenever uninformed traders glean trading 
information by directly observing the transactions of informed traders.”). 
266 Id. at 574.
267 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2005) (requiring only that officers, directors, and ten 
percent shareholders – no other insiders – disclose their trades in their own 
company’s securities within two business days).
268
 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 575 (describing price decoding).
269 Id. at 574 (noting that “uninformed traders must be able to identify informed 
traders individually and observe their trading activities directly”).
270 Id. 574-75 (noting that price decoding “does not require uninformed traders to 
discover the identity of their informed cohorts”).
271 Id. at 575 (summarizing “the logic of price decoding” as follows:  “When trading 
on insider information is of sufficient volume to cause a change in price, this 
otherwise inexplicable change may itself signal the presence of new information to 
the uninformed.”).
272 Id. at 575-76 (explaining that price decoding may permit investors to determine 
the actual content of the information generating insider trades).
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equity.273  Correction of overvaluation requires only that investors know that 
insiders believe, and are willing to bet money on the fact, that their firm is 
overvalued.  Because investors need not know the reason for the insiders’ 
belief, the enhanced information provided by price decoding is of little value 
if the goal is simply to align price with fundamental value.274  Moreover, the 
precondition for trade decoding is more likely to be met than the 
precondition for price decoding.  It is unlikely that insiders believing a firm 
to be overvalued will sell enough stock to move the market price by altering 
supply.275  It is more likely that insider sales (or purchases of put options) 
will be revealed to the market.  First, insiders’ brokers may tend to share 
information regarding insider transactions with others.276  Second, many 
insiders (officers, directors, and shareholders owning at least ten percent of 
voting securities) will have to disclose their sales within two business days 
pursuant to Exchange Act Section 16(a),277 a provision that has been rather
markedly amended since Professors Gilson and Kraakman opined that trade 
decoding would be unlikely to occur in a timely fashion.278
273 Id. at 631 (arguing that trade decoding is the primary means by which insider 
trading leads to market efficiency).
274
 This is simply an application of F.A. Hayek’s famous point that for efficiency 
purposes it is not necessary for decision makers to know why willingness to pay for 
a commodity has changed, but merely that it has.  See Hayek, supra note 34, at 525 
(“It is always a question of the relative importance of the particular things with 
which he is concerned, and the causes which alter their relative importance are of no 
interest to him beyond the effect on those concrete things of his own 
environment.”).
275 See supra note 263 (noting the unlikelihood that non-transitory stock price 
changes could be occasioned by supply effects resulting from insider transactions). 
276
 This is an instance of what Professors Gilson and Kraakman term “pure” 
informational leakage, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 572-73.
277
 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2) (2005).
278
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 
2002), amended Section 16(a) to require that insider transactions be reported within 
two business days, that they be reported electronically (so the SEC could quickly 
make them public), and that they be posted on the relevant corporation’s Internet 
website at the time of reporting.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2) (2005) (reflecting 
Sarbanes-Oxley amendments).  Prior to this amendment, Section 16(a) permitted 
paper filing, did not require disclosure at the corporation level, and required 
reporting to the SEC only by the tenth day of the month following the transaction at 
issue (so up to forty days could pass before insider trades were publicly reported).  
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2001) (pre-Sarbanes-Oxley).  Thus, Professors Gilson and 
Kraakman argued (in 1984) that “while certain insiders are required by Section 
16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act to disclose their trading, disclosure is required 
only some ten to forty days after the trade, hardly an aid to efficient operation of the 
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Of course, the easier it is for market participants to identify instances of 
insider selling (and thus to engage in trade decoding), the more likely price 
correction is to occur, and to do so rapidly.279  Thus, a corporation seeking to 
prevent the overvaluation of its stock by liberalizing PDIT would probably 
adopt procedures that would ensure that such trades could quickly be 
identified by traders.  It might, for example, require its agents to report their 
sales (or purchases of put options) immediately, or it might require agents to 
funnel all such transactions through particular brokers, who would 
immediately report the transactions as a matter of course.  The firm would 
also ensure that the reported information was publicized as quickly as 
possible, perhaps by maintaining a constantly updated Internet site 
cataloguing insider stock sales and put option purchases.  Analysts 
following the company, then, could monitor the site for interesting trades 
(i.e., large sales or put purchases by employees in a position to know some 
sort of price-decreasing information) and could direct their clients to trade in 
accordance with the information they gleaned.280  In short, most firms would 
elect a policy that permitted immediately disclosed PDIT.
2. Potential Problems
The primary objective of a corporate policy liberalizing PDIT could be 
achieved only if corporate insiders would actually engage in authorized 
PDIT.  Moreover, the liberalized PDIT policy would be counterproductive if 
the value enhancement occasioned by preventing and reducing 
overvaluation were outweighed by value destruction resulting from an 
increase in corporate mismanagement.  Critics may therefore contend (1) 
that corporate insiders would not engage in PDIT even if permitted to do so, 
or (2) that the value loss resulting from authorizing PDIT would outweigh 
any value enhancement occasioned by reducing the incidence and 
magnitude of equity overvaluation.  Neither criticism undermines the case 
for a liberalized PDIT policy.
derivatively informed trading mechanism.”  Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 
632.
279
 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 868 (“The greater the ability of market 
participants to identify insider trading, the more information such trading will 
convey.”); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 37, at 631-32 (“[T]he greater the 
number of uninformed traders who are able to learn the identity of insider traders, 
the size of their trades, and other derivative information, the more effectively the 
derivatively informed trading mechanism will operate and the greater will be the 
market’s relative efficiency with respect to the inside information.”).  
280
 A number of private services compile information on insider trading reports and 
distribute it to market participants.  See Fried, supra note 262, at 324.
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a. Would Insiders Actually Engage in Disclosed 
PDIT?
There are several reasons to doubt that PDIT, even if authorized, would 
be widespread.  In many (perhaps most) corporate cultures, betting against 
the company would be considered treasonous, and insiders considering 
whether to engage in PDIT might be concerned about negative job 
repercussions.281  Perhaps more importantly, insiders may forego PDIT 
because they personally stand to benefit from overvalued equity.  Many 
insiders attain reputational benefits from being associated with a firm with a 
high stock price,282 and, of course, the value of their holdings of company
stock is enhanced, at least temporarily, if the stock is overvalued. Thus, 
even if they know the mispricing will eventually be corrected, one might
expect them to hold on to appreciating stock for as long as possible so as to 
maximize their trading gains.  In addition, insiders may worry that a price 
correction will result in a corporate shake-up that threatens their jobs or 
compensation.283 One therefore might initially wonder whether insiders 
who knew of overvaluation would reveal it by engaging in authorized PDIT. 
They likely would, for the temptation of financial rewards would 
probably overwhelm the forces stifling PDIT.  A company that had adopted 
a liberalized PDIT policy would have made an apparent attempt to alter the 
corporate norms against betting against the company, so insiders 
considering whether to engage in PDIT would have received an implicit 
green light from their principals.  Undoubtedly, some corporations would
adopt an “official” liberalized PDIT policy, while simultaneously 
maintaining a corporate norm that such trading is improper, but such a 
clandestine norm would be difficult to maintain.  In the end, the constant 
allure of potential insider trading profits (which grow as the extent of 
overvaluation increases) coupled with the corporation’s official imprimatur 
on PDIT would likely lead to defections by rogue insiders, who would have 
strong grounds for attacking any apparently retaliatory employment 
decision.  Corporate norms against PDIT, then, likely pose little barrier to 
the success of a liberalized PDIT policy.
Nor is it likely that insiders would collusively refrain from engaging in 
PDIT in order to maintain and enhance a high stock price.  As antitrust 
281 Cf. Surowiecki, supra note 54, at 224-27 (discussing powerful social norms 
against short-selling).
282 See supra notes 141 - 143 and accompanying text.
283
 This is a version of the “last period” problem discussed supra at notes 62 - 63
and accompanying text.
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scholars have long noted, cartels are inherently unstable.284  Because the first 
colluder to defect gains a disproportionate share of any surplus created by 
the collusion, each participant has a private incentive to be the first 
defector.285 With price-fixing, the first cartel member to lower his price 
from the agreed-upon level stands to steal business from all other 
participants, so cheating (or the possibility thereof) usually undermines a 
cartel.286  Here, the first insider to engage in disclosed PDIT would make the 
most money on her sale, for after the initial instance of publicly disclosed 
PDIT, the price at which subsequent sales could be consummated would
likely be reduced.  Each insider colluding to keep the stock price inflated 
would therefore face a private incentive to be the first defector.287  And, of 
course, the magnitude of this incentive would grow as the discrepancy 
between price and value expanded.  Any conspiracy to refrain from PDIT is 
therefore likely to fail.
Ultimately, liberalized PDIT provides a means of rewarding 
whistleblowers with a “bounty” for conveying information (via their 
trading) that the stock price is overvalued.  In many – perhaps most – cases, 
the price inflation will be due to some concealment by insiders.  Thus, in 
authorizing publicly disclosed PDIT, a corporation would be putting in place 
a bounty system designed to promote candor by rewarding insiders who 
blew the whistle on non-disclosure of material information.  The financial 
rewards available from this sort of bounty scheme (which is a well-
established means of combating fraud288 and would be valued by investors) 
284 See 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 420-21 (Richard Schmalensee 
& Richard D. Willig eds., 1989) (explaining how incentives to cheat render cartels 
inherently unstable).
285 See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 
518 (2004) (observing that “cartels are inherently unstable” because members have 
an incentive to cheat by defecting or reporting the cartel).
286 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2A ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 405b2, at __ 
(noting that “price fixing often carries the seeds of its own destruction[,] [f]or the 
effect of fixing a price well above costs is to induce each collaborator to try to win 
additional sales”).
287 Cf. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 874 (“Collusion to decrease the value of 
the firm among managers in pursuit of trading profits is unlikely to succeed 
because, as in all cartels, each rational member will cheat insofar as the gains to the 
lone cheater from exposing others will exceed his gains from collusion.”).
288
 For example, the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 
(2005), permit a private plaintiff to bring a civil action under the act on behalf of the 
government, and if the action is successful, the private plaintiff receives a statutory 
bounty from the government’s recovery.  Id. at § 3730(d).  See generally QUI TAM 
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would likely drive knowledgeable insiders to engage in PDIT, despite any 
official corporate norms or collusive tendencies that might discourage such 
trading. 
b. What About Corporate Mismanagement and/or 
Impairment of Intra-Firm Information Flow?
Even if one were confident that insiders would engage in authorized 
PDIT, thereby reducing the incidence and magnitude of overvalued equity, 
one might still oppose a liberalized PDIT policy if it threatened to cause
value-reducing actions by insiders.  At least two types of conduct are 
potentially troubling.  First, authorizing PDIT may create a perverse 
incentive for insiders to create conditions that reduce stock price and then to 
trade before the stock price falls.289  Second, liberalizing PDIT may impair 
the intra-firm flow of important information, for insiders at each level within 
the corporate hierarchy may delay the transmission of negative information 
until they have traded on the bad news.290  If the investor losses occasioned 
by deliberate mismanagement or delayed disclosure outweigh the value of
gains resulting from reducing equity overvaluation, a policy liberalizing 
PDIT will not be optimal.
In actuality, there is probably little reason to worry about deliberate 
mismanagement or delayed disclosure.  As Professors Carlton and Fischel 
have observed, mismanagement occasioned by the possibility of gains from 
PDIT is unlikely because corporate managers, who generally work in teams, 
cannot engage in value-destroying mismanagement without persuading their 
colleagues to go along with the strategy, and any particular employee’s 
ability to engage in mismanagement will therefore be constrained by his 
colleagues’ attempts to maximize firm value or to gain personally by 
LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT (Howard W. Cox & Peter B. Hutt II 
eds., 2d ed. 1999).
289
 As noted, see supra notes 14, 21-22 and accompanying text, one of the chief 
arguments against deregulating insider trading in general is that such deregulation 
would create perverse incentives for managers to create “bad news” upon which 
they could earn trading profits.  See generally Levmore, supra note 14, at 149 
(noting that if insider trading is permitted “an insider can profit from a decrease in 
the firm’s stock price as well as in increase; the temptation of profit might actually 
encourage an insider to act against the corporation’s interest”); Mendelson, supra
note 14, at 489-90; Schotland, supra note 3, at 1451.
290 See Haft, supra note 13, at 1054-55 (arguing that, if insider trading were 
permitted, “subordinates would stall the upward flow of critical information to 
maximize their opportunities for financial gain,” resulting in an “impair[ment] [of] 
corporate decision-making at all hierarchical levels”).
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exposing proposed mismanagement.291  Moreover, if PDIT must be 
immediately disclosed, as would be likely,292 any traders responsible for 
causing a stock price to fall would be exposed.  Both senior managers and 
plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to pay keen attention to PDIT disclosures.  If an 
insider’s trade were followed by a stock price decrease, and the insider’s 
position within the firm suggested that he had some control over the 
business decision(s) that reduced the firm’s value, he would likely be 
subject to adverse employment action or, if he were senior enough, to a 
derivative suit.293  Similarly, if an insider were to delay disclosure of 
negative information in order to trade on it first, his superiors could easily 
note the timing of his trade and, if the delay harmed (or could have harmed)
the enterprise,294 would likely punish the offender.  In short, publicity will 
police instances of deliberate mismanagement and delay in conveying 
information.
Of course, the ultimate rejoinder to claims that the liberalized PDIT 
policy proposed herein will reduce corporate value is that the proposed 
policy is merely a default rule.  If a corporation finds that the costs 
associated with a liberalized PDIT policy exceed the benefits to investors, it 
will likely jettison the policy, for competitive capital markets encourage 
firms to minimize their costs of capital by adopting insider trading policies 
that maximize firm value.295  This Article argues that most firms would 
likely adopt a policy permitting PDIT while generally banning PEIT.  If that 
rule is adopted as the default policy, firms discovering that liberalized PDIT 
creates greater losses than benefits can – and will – adopt more restrictive 
291 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 874 (noting that “the ability of any one 
manager to pursue bad opportunities will be constrained because other managers 
and employees will attempt to maximize the firm’s value”).
292 See supra notes 260 - 280 and accompanying text (arguing that firms adopting a 
liberalized PDIT policy would likely require contemporaneous disclosure of such 
trades).
293
 Plaintiffs’ lawyers are the driving force behind most derivate litigation.  See
Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 367 (“[T]he real party in interest—the party on the 
plaintiffs’ side with the greatest personal interest in the outcome of the [derivative] 
litigation—is the plaintiffs’ attorney rather than the nominal shareholder-plaintiff.”).  
Under a regime permitting publicized PDIT, those attorneys would likely follow 
insider trading disclosures and initiate actions against insiders who appear to have 
contributed to value-reducing corporate decisions.   
294
 Given the speed with which securities trades can be executed, delaying 
conveyance of information in order to first trade on it likely would have little 
adverse effect on the intra-firm flow of information.
295 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 862-63 (“If it is bad, firms that allow 
insider trading will be at a competitive disadvantage compared with firms that 
curtail insider trading.”).  
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policies.296  In particular, they may limit by contract the class of insiders 
permitted to engage in PDIT.  They may decide, for example, that senior 
managers, who are best able to create bad news, should not be permitted to 
engage in such trading.  Capital market pressure will lead them to adopt the 
PDIT restrictions most favored by investors.
III. The Legal Feasibility of an Asymmetric Insider Trading 
Regime
Part II argued that an asymmetric insider trading regime, in which PDIT 
is treated more leniently than PEIT, is the majoritarian default—i.e., the 
bargain managers and investors would likely strike were they able to 
negotiate freely.  This Part argues that such an asymmetric regime is feasible 
under current insider trading doctrine, even if unclear issues raised by 
current doctrine are resolved in a manner that is fairly hostile toward efforts 
to contract out of insider trading liability.
In order to articulate this legal argument, I must begin with a brief 
summary of insider trading doctrine.  Many readers will no doubt be 
familiar with the relevant legal rules and may therefore wish to skip Subpart 
A, which describes current insider trading doctrine, and proceed directly to
Subpart B, which explains why an asymmetric insider trading regime would 
be permissible under current law.297
296
 Of course, a corollary to this position is that the ban on price-enhancing insider 
trading should also be waiveable.  If a corporation were to discover that the costs 
associated with PEIT (e.g., the potential for squandered corporate opportunities, see 
supra notes 219 - 224 and accompanying text) were outweighed by benefits (e.g., 
lower salary requirements for managers, see supra notes 28 - 31 and accompanying 
text), the corporation should be permitted to opt out of the ban on PEIT.  Professors 
Carlton and Fischel have argued for this type of private contractual approach to 
insider trading.  See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 861-66.  While I am entirely 
sympathetic to their position, my point here is merely that an asymmetric insider 
trading policy permitting PDIT but not PEIT is likely the policy most corporate 
constituents would bargain for if legally and practically able to do so and therefore 
ought to be adopted as the default policy.  Moreover, for reasons explained below, 
the asymmetric insider trading policy proposed herein could be adopted under 
current law.  See infra notes 344 - 368 and accompanying text.  By contrast, the 
purely contractual approach advocated by Professors Carlton and Fischel probably 
is not achievable under current law.  See id. 
297
 While current law would permit authorized PDIT, the SEC, which has a long 
history of seeking to expand the insider trading prohibition, see Bainbridge, supra 
note 4, at 583-86 (discussing regulators’ zeal to expand insider trading prohibition 
beyond limits of enabling statute). would probably pursue legal action against 
corporations that attempted to authorize PDIT and/or against the insiders who 
traded pursuant to such authorization.  Accordingly, corporations are unlikely to 
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A. Current Legal Doctrine
Insider trading, generally defined as trading in securities while in 
possession of material, non-public information,298 may run afoul of several 
provisions of federal law.  In addition to Section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act,299 which posits a prophylactic ban on “short-swing profits” 
earned by certain insiders trading in their own companies’ stock,300 there are 
three basic theories under which trading on inside information may violate 
federal law.301  Two of these theories, the “disclose or abstain” rule (also 
called the “classical theory”) and the misappropriation doctrine, derive from 
Securities Exchange Rule 10b-5,302 which is a general anti-fraud rule that
was promulgated pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act.303  The third theory derives from Securities Exchange Rule 14e-3,304 a 
more narrowly tailored rule that was promulgated under Exchange Act 
Section 14(e). 305
1. The Disclose or Abstain Rule
When it applies, the disclose or abstain rule requires a trader possessing 
material non-public information either to disclose her inside information 
before trading or to abstain from trading altogether.306  The rule had its 
authorize PDIT, despite the likely legality of such trading, absent express approval 
of such trading by regulators.  
298
 Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 772. 
299
 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2005).
300
 Section 16(b) requires a defined set of corporate insiders (directors, officers, and 
shareholders possessing at least ten percent of voting securities) to disgorge profits 
on any set of purchase and sale transactions occurring within a six month period.  15 
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2005).  This disgorgement requirement applies regardless of 
whether the statutory insider traded on the basis of, or even possessed, material non-
public information.  It therefore is not an insider trading ban per se.
301
 Insider trading may also violate federal mail and wire fraud laws, see 18 U.S.C. § 
1341 (2005) (mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2005) (wire fraud), but the theory of 
fraud under those provisions mirrors the two theories under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-
5 and will not be discussed here.  See L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
SECURITIES REGULATION 741-43 (1995).
302
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
303
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005).
304
 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a).
305
 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
306 See generally Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 531-37 (discussing disclose or abstain 
rule).  In a face-to-face transaction, the information must be disclosed, prior to 
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genesis in Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,307 discussed above,308 in which the 
Second Circuit held that insiders of a corporation that owned land upon 
which a valuable mineral deposit was discovered had violated Rule 10b-5 by 
purchasing stock of their company prior to public disclosure of the ore 
strike.309  This duty to disclose or abstain, the court reasoned, was inherent 
in Rule 10b-5’s underlying policy of protecting “the justifiable expectation 
of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal 
exchanges have relatively equal access to material information.”310
In Chiarella v. United States,311 the Supreme Court expressed approval 
of a disclose or abstain rule but found it to be based not on some implicit 
policy of equal access to information but instead on the fiduciary 
relationship existing between a corporate insider and her trading partner.312
The Court reasoned that Rule 10b-5’s prohibition on fraud is violated when 
a corporate insider, who owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation’s 
shareholders, purchases stock from a shareholder without first informing her 
of material, non-public information of which the insider is aware.313  The 
fraud, of course, is not an affirmative misrepresentation (assuming the 
insider did not actually lie about the information to which he was privy), but 
trading, directly to the insider’s trading partner.  If the transaction is accomplished 
on an impersonal stock exchange, as most securities transactions are, the 
information must first be publicly disclosed via some broad medium (e.g., a 
newswire).  
307
 401 F.2d 833.
308 See supra notes 217 - 222 and accompanying text.
309 Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852.
310 Id. at 848 (holding that, in light of Rule 10b-5’s underlying policy of equal 
access to information, “anyone in possession of material inside information must 
either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in 
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain 
from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such inside 
information remains undisclosed.”).
311
 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
312 Id. at 235 (“We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the 
mere possession of nonpublic market information.”); id. at 233 (declining to 
recognize “a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo 
actions based on material, non-public information” because “[f]ormulation of such a 
broad duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises 
from a specific relationship between to parties, … should not be undertaken absent 
some explicit evidence of congressional intent”).
313 Id. at 227-30 (explaining how fraud may result from non-disclosure by corporate 
insider who is a fiduciary of his trading partner).
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is instead failure to speak in the face of a duty to do so.314  The duty to 
speak, the Court reasoned, arises from the fiduciary relationship between 
insider and trader.315  Accordingly, the Chiarella defendant, an employee of 
a printing firm hired to assist the buyer in a corporate acquisition, could not 
have violated Rule 10b-5 by purchasing stock of the target corporation, for 
he was not a fiduciary of the target corporation’s shareholders and thus had 
no duty to disclose the non-public information in his possession.316  The 
Court’s reasoning implied, though, that corporate insiders possessing 
material, non-public information would violate Rule 10b-5 if they traded in 
their company’s stock without first disclosing their inside information.
The Chiarella Court’s conclusion that a fiduciary relationship created 
the insider’s duty to disclose or abstain reined in Texas Gulf Sulphur, which 
would have imposed such a duty whenever anyone with material, non-public 
information traded with anyone else.  A subsequent Court decision showed, 
however, that the disclose or abstain duty still applies fairly broadly.  In 
Dirks v. SEC,317 the Court posited two rules that expanded the reach of the 
disclose or abstain rule.  First, the Court noted that nominal outsiders whose 
relationship with the corporation is sufficiently close (e.g., lawyers, 
underwriters, consultants) may be deemed “constructive insiders” and may 
therefore be subject to the disclose or abstain rule.318  In addition, the Court 
reasoned that under certain circumstances the rule will apply to outsider
“tippees” who receive material, non-public information from actual or 
constructive insiders.319
Despite its expansion in Dirks, the disclose or abstain rule left a 
substantial loophole in the insider trading liability scheme.  If the duty to 
314 Id. at 228 (“[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the 
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do 
so.”).
315 Id. at 227 (“That the relationship between a corporate insider and the 
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel 
twist of the law.”). 
316 Id. at 231-35 (explaining basis of reversal of defendant’s conviction).
317
 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
318 Id. at 655, n. 14 (“Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate 
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or 
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of 
the shareholders.”).
319
 The Court explained that “a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when [1] the 
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the 
information to the tippee and [2] the tippee knows or should know that there has 
been a breach.”  Id. at 660. 
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disclose or abstain, and thus potential insider trading liability, arises from 
the fiduciary relationship between a corporate insider and her trading 
partner, individuals who are neither insiders (actual or constructive) nor 
tippees (“inheritors” of an insider’s fiduciary duty) may freely trade on the 
basis of material, non-public information.  For example, an attorney 
representing the bidder in a forthcoming tender offer could freely purchase 
stock of the target corporation prior to the announcement of the tender offer, 
for the attorney would not owe her trading partner a duty to disclose and 
thus could not be liable for fraud.  To respond to this loophole, the SEC 
adopted Rule 14e-3 and pressed the Supreme Court to approve the 
“misappropriation doctrine.” 
2. Rule 14e-3 
Rule 14e-3,320 adopted pursuant to the SEC’s statutory authority to 
“prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent” fraud in connection with 
a tender offer,321 prohibits anyone with knowledge of a forthcoming tender 
offer from trading on that information prior to public disclosure of the offer.  
Specifically, the rule states that if an offeror has taken “a substantial step” 
toward making a tender offer, anyone who has learned of the forthcoming 
offer from the offeror, the offeree, or an agent of either must refrain from 
trading in the securities of either (unless one of the narrow, enumerated 
exceptions applies) until there has been public disclosure of the offer “by 
press release or otherwise”322  Moreover, insiders of a bidder or target may 
not divulge confidential information about a tender offer to persons who are 
likely to violate the rule by trading on the basis of that information.323  The 
rule thus closes the loophole left by Chiarella and Dirks, but only with 
respect to inside information related to tender offers.  The rule does not ban 
trading by outsiders on the basis of non-public information that is not related 
to a forthcoming tender offer.  
3. The Misappropriation Doctrine
The misappropriation doctrine aims to close the loophole left by Rule 
14e-3.  Under the misappropriation theory, a person who receives material, 
non-public information via a fiduciary or confidential relationship defrauds 
the source of her information if she trades upon it without first informing 
that source of her intention to do so. 324  The SEC had articulated the 
320
 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2005).
321
 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2005).
322
 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2005).
323
 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(e) (2005).
324 See infra notes 339 - 341 and accompanying text.
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misappropriation theory in Chiarella, arguing before the Supreme Court that 
the defendant’s secret trading amounted to fraud against the source of his 
non-public information and thus gave rise to a violation of Rule 10b-5.325
While four justices accepted the theory,326 the Chiarella majority declined to 
base liability upon it because it had not been presented to the jury.327  The 
Second Circuit, however, approved the misappropriation theory as a basis 
for Rule 10b-5 liability in United States v. Newman328 and relied upon the 
theory in several other insider trading cases.329
The Supreme Court eventually approved the theory in United States v. 
O’Hagan.330  Defendant O’Hagan’s law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, had been 
retained to assist Grand Metropolitan PLC with a possible tender offer for 
Pillsbury Company.331  Because of his position at the firm, O’Hagan learned 
of Grand Metropolitan’s plans and, unbeknownst to his partners or Grand 
Metropolitan, purchased Pillsbury call options and shares.332  When the 
tender offer was announced, Pillsbury stock soared, enabling O’Hagan to 
reap a $4.3 million profit.333  The government quickly charged O’Hagan 
with insider trading.334  It could not, however, establish a claim under the 
classical disclose or abstain rule approved in Chiarella, for O’Hagan was 
not a fiduciary of his trading partners (Pillsbury shareholders and call 
writers) and thus could not have defrauded them by failing to speak in the 
face of a duty to do so.335  The government therefore charged O’Hagan with 
violations of federal mail fraud statutes and Rule 14e-3.336  It also asserted 
that he violated Rule 10b-5 by deceiving the sources of his inside 
325 See Brief for the United States in Chiarella v. United States (available at 1979 
WL 199454) at *28-*38.
326 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
327 Id. at 235-36.
328
 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
329 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1968), aff’d on 
other grounds, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Materia, 745 
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
330
 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
331 Id. at 647.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 648.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 653 n. 5 (“The Government could not have prosecuted O’Hagan under the 
classical theory, for O’Hagan was not an ‘insider’ of Pillsbury, the corporation in 
whose stock he traded.”). 
336 Id. at 648-49.
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information – his law firm (Dorsey & Whitney) and its client (Grand 
Metropolitan), both of whom he owed fiduciary duties.337  A jury convicted 
O’Hagan on all counts.338
In affirming O’Hagan’s conviction, the Supreme Court expressly 
approved the government’s assertion that “a person commits fraud ‘in 
connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities 
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the 
information.”339 Such a trader “deal[s] in deception,” the Court stated, 
because he feigns loyalty to his source while actually using confidential 
information for his own self-serving purposes.340  Because this feigned 
loyalty occurs “in connection with” a sale or purchase of a security, the 
Court reasoned, it violates Rule 10b-5.341  The Court thus recognized the 
misappropriation theory as a “complement” to the classical disclose or 
abstain theory:  In the latter, securities fraud occurs because the trader fails 
to disclose information to his trading partner, of whom he is a fiduciary; in 
the former, securities fraud occurs because the trader “feigns fidelity to the 
source” of his information, a source to whom he owes fiduciary duties.342
The Court was careful to note, though, that there can be no liability under 
the misappropriation theory when the trader first informs his source of his 
intention to trade on the source’s information.343
337 Id. at 648, 653.
338 Id. at 649.
339 Id. at 652.
340 Id. at 653.
341 Id. at 656 (“This [‘in connection with’] element is satisfied because the 
fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains the confidential 
information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information 
to purchase or sell securities.  The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus 
coincide.”).
342
 The Court explained:
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to 
capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale 
of securities.  The classical theory targets a corporation insider’s 
breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; 
the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of 
nonpublic information by a corporate ‘outsider’ in breach of a 
duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the 
information.
Id. at 652-53.
343 Id. at 655 (“Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory 
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary informs the 
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B. The Permissibility of (Authorized) PDIT Under Current Legal 
Doctrine
The liability scheme described in Subpart A leaves open two questions 
that affect the legality of authorized PDIT.344  First, does Rule 10b-5 
prohibit only “deceptive” insider trading, or does the rule reach all instances 
of classical insider trading that involve a breach of fiduciary duty?345
Second, if the latter, are the relevant fiduciary duties purely contractual in 
nature?346 This subpart examines the legality of authorized PDIT given the 
possible answers to these two open questions of law.  It concludes that 
authorized PDIT is legally permissible under all three possible legal 
scenarios: where the law forbids only deceptive insider trading (Part II.B.1);
where even candid (i.e., non-deceptive) classical insider trading is forbidden 
but fiduciary duties are contractual in nature (Part II.B.2); and where the law 
forbids candid classical insider trading and fiduciary duties are not purely 
matters of contract (Part II.B.3).    
1. If Only Deceptive Insider Trading Is 
Forbidden
Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued persuasively that “candid”
insider trading – i.e., insider trading in which the insider has stated up front 
that she may trade on the basis of material, non-public information – cannot 
violate Rule 10b-5.347 Professor Prakash reasons that Rule 10b-5 and its 
enabling statute prohibit only intentional misrepresentations, not mere 
breaches of fiduciary duty.348  Thus, insider trading that involves a breach of 
source that he plans to trade on the non-public information, there is no ‘deceptive
device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation….”).
344
 “Authorized” PDIT refers to PDIT conducted by an insider at a company that has 
explicitly permitted such trading.
345 See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 548-49 (observing that O’Hagan left open 
whether “brazen misappropriators” could violate Rule10b-5 and whether 
“authorized trading” could give rise to liability under the classical theory).
346 See Larry Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty in Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 539 (1997) (discussing “the long-standing debate 
between those who have argued that fiduciary duties are and should be essentially 
contractual in nature and those who argue for some restrictions on waiving those 
duties”).
347 See Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1491 (1999).
348 Id. at 1510 (“O’Hagan correctly reaffirms that a breach of fiduciary duty is 
simply not enough for misappropriation or Rule 10b-5 liability; a deception is 
necessary.”) (emphasis in original).  The Supreme Court first established that 
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fiduciary duty to a trading partner or information source, but does not 
involve feigned fidelity to that person, simply cannot violate Rule 10b-5 
(unless, of course, the trading involves some other form of fraud).349  Such 
trading may be punishable under state laws governing fiduciary duties, but it 
is not fraudulent.
The primary basis for Professor Prakash’s claim that Rule 10b-5 does 
not reach candid trading is the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s O’Hagan
decision.350  In that decision, the Court (1) reiterated that the deception 
involved in insider trading is what causes such trading to run afoul of Rule 
10b-5;351 (2) clarified that the deception at issue in a misappropriation case 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not prohibit mere breaches of fiduciary duty in 
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in which the Court held that 
controlling shareholders who breached a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders by 
offering allegedly inadequate consideration in a short-form merger would not, 
absent deception, transgress Rule 10b-5.  Id. at 473-76. The Court explained:
The language of § 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant 
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception. 
… Thus the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint 
states a cause of action under any part of Rule 10b-5 only if the 
conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as “manipulative or 
deceptive” within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 473-74.
349
 Prakash, supra note 347, at 1510-12.
350 Id. at 1510 (“Properly understood, [O’Hagan] indicates that classical insiders 
may avoid Rule 10b-5 liability even when they trade on material, non-public 
information on an anonymous exchange, so long as they do not deceive their 
shareholders.”). Professor Prakash also cites pre-O’Hagan appeals court cases in 
support of his decision.  See id. at 1507-09 (citing Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073 
(10th Cir. 1993) and McCormick v. Fund American Companies Inc., 26 F.3d 869 
(9th Cir. 1994)).  In Jensen, the Tenth Circuit held that a purported insider’s failure 
to disclose certain material, non-public information prior to trading did not violate 
Rule 10b-5 because the trader openly revealed his “failure to disclose” further 
information.”  Jensen, 1 F.3d at 1078.  The court explained that when “the non-
disclosing party explicitly informs the other party of his failure to disclose [material, 
non-public information], an omission will not be misleading” in the absence of 
special circumstances.  Id.  In McCormick, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 
company’s candid refusal to disclose all material, non-public information prior to 
purchasing its shares did not mislead a “sophisticated” seller.  McCormick, 26 F.3d 
at 884.  Professor Prakash argues that the reasoning of Jensen and McCormick adds 
further support to the view that candid insider trading, even if it violates a fiduciary 
duty, cannot violate Rule 10b-5.  Prakash, supra note 347, at 1509.
351 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (recognizing that “§10(b) is not an all-purpose breach 
of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains on conduct involving manipulation or 
deception”).
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is the trader’s “feigning fidelity” to the source of her information;352 and (3) 
conceded that a misappropriator who informed her source of her intention to 
trade before actually doing so could not violate Rule 10b-5 (though she 
might be liable for breach of fiduciary duty).353  Professor Prakash 
concludes that such reasoning must similarly apply in classical (i.e., disclose 
or abstain) insider trading cases:  Since deception must be present for there 
to be a violation of Rule 10b-5, and since the deception at issue in a classical 
insider trading case is feigned fidelity to the trading partner, an insider may 
avoid liability under Rule 10b-5 by stating prior to trading that she intends 
to trade on the basis of material, non-public information.354  Such an 
admission, which would preclude the feigned fidelity that gives rise to Rule 
10b-5 liability, could be made by the insider to her trading partner in a face-
to-face transaction or by the insider to the market in general (via public 
disclosure) in an exchange transaction.355  Moreover, if the corporation
announced generally that its agents may trade on the basis of material, non-
public information, then the agents, in doing so, would not be feigning 
fidelity to their trading partners, who would be on notice that corporate 
agents might buy from or sell to them on the basis of inside information.356
Under Professor Prakash’s interpretation of post-O’Hagan insider trading 
doctrine, then, a corporation would be free to adopt a policy authorizing 
PDIT, and an insider who traded pursuant to such policy would not violate 
Rule 10b-5.
While Professor Prakash’s understanding of insider trading doctrine is 
intuitively appealing (and would appear to be the only interpretation that can 
352 Id. (“[T]he deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves feigning 
fidelity to the source of information….”).
353 Id. (“Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves 
feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary informs the source that 
he plans to trade on the non-public information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and 
thus no § 10(b) violation – although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable 
under state law for breach of a duty of loyalty.”).
354
 Prakash, supra note 347, at 1515 (“After disclosing an intent to trade on material, 
non-public information to the shareholders, any insider breach can no longer be 
considered concealed or deceptive. It is out in the open.”).
355 Id. at 1515-16 (discussing various ways disclosure of intent to trade might 
occur).
356 Id. at 1516 (“[I]f company Y authorizes X's insider trades, later trades certainly 
cannot be considered fraudulent.”).  Moreover, if the corporation had previously 
announced that its insiders may trade on the basis of material, non-public 
information, then an outsider trader’s reliance on any belief regarding insiders’ 
“fidelity” would not be justifiable and thus could not support a fraud claim.
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make sense of O’Hagan’s dictum regarding authorized trading357), it has not 
garnered a wide following.  No post-O’Hagan decision has approved 
Professor Prakash’s reasoning, and most commentators that have considered 
his position have suggested that it would not be accepted by the Supreme 
Court, which would likely confine O’Hagan’s reasoning to misappropriation 
cases.358  Thus, we should consider the legality of authorized PDIT under a 
legal regime in which classical insider trading liability is not limited to
deceptive insider trading. 
2. If Even Candid Classical Insider Trading is 
Forbidden, But Fiduciary Duties Are
Contractual in Nature
If the law imposes liability for classical insider trading even if the 
possibility of such trading is disclosed in advance (so that the trader is not 
feigning fidelity to her trading partner), then the basis of liability must be 
something other than fraud.  Most likely, the basis for liability would be 
357 See supra note 353.
358 See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha 
Stewart, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2055 n. 141 (2005) (arguing that Prakash’s 
position “is incorrect in that there is no case that follows Prakash’s analysis in the 
case of classic insider trading (i.e., where the source of the information is the issuer 
of the securities)”); Stephen J. Choi, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital 
Markets, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 533, 568 n. 141 (2002) (noting Prakash’s position 
and responding that “it is doubtful that courts would accept a one-time blanket 
statement of an intent to trade as equivalent to the disclosure of the actual material 
non-public information upon which insiders seek to trade”); Zohar Goshen & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property 
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1262 n. 108 (2001) (“A proper reading 
of O’Hagan implies a key distinction between inside information in the classic 
sense—information originating from the affected firm used by one of its insiders—
and a different type of inside information—information generated by outsiders who 
are not employees of the affected firm. While the prohibition on trading involving 
classic inside information is clearly mandatory, and cannot be contracted around, 
the prohibition on trading involving information generated by outsiders is subject to 
contracting like any other property interest.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 52 SMU L. 
REV. 1589, 1647-48 (1999) (acknowledging that O’Hagan’s reasoning would seem 
to suggest that candid classical insider trading does not violate Rule 10b-5, but 
predicting that the Supreme Court would eschew such a position); Alan Strudler & 
Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 
436 n. 271 (1999) (rejecting “the insidious suggestion that a prior disclosure of an 
intention to trade on material nonpublic information or ‘candid insider trading’ 
should be countenanced as an exception”).
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some fiduciary duty breach that would be taken to violate Rule 10b-5.359 If 
the gravamen of a classical insider trading claim is breach of fiduciary duty, 
rather than fraud, then even authorized PDIT could violate Rule 10b-5 if the 
trading at issue involved a breach of the requisite duty.
But this assumes that fiduciary duties cannot be altered via contract, a 
point upon which legal scholars vehemently disagree.360 Under the view 
espoused by the “contractarians,” who maintain that fiduciary duties are 
ultimately contractual in nature, a corporation could effectively legalize 
PDIT even if the gravamen of a classical insider trading violation were 
breach of fiduciary duty rather than deception based on feigned fidelity to 
the trading partner. By authorizing PDIT, the corporation would be 
contractually tailoring the fiduciary duties its agents owe to shareholders so 
that those duties would not include a duty to disclose material, non-public 
359
 Hinging Rule 10b-5 liability on a breach of fiduciary duty that does not amount 
to actual deception would seem to run afoul of the Supreme Court’s Santa Fe 
holding.  See supra note 348 (discussing holding of Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. 462).
360 Compare Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty in Contracts in Unincorporated 
Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 541 (1997) (characterizing fiduciary duties as 
“a hypothetical bargain—that is, contract terms the parties themselves would have 
agreed to in the absence of transaction costs”); John H. Langbein, The 
Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L. J. 625, 629 (1995) (“The 
rules of trust fiduciary law mean to capture the likely understanding of the parties to 
the trust deal....”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (urging that there is nothing 
special about fiduciary obligations and positing that fiduciary obligations arise from 
“contractual” (and thus consensual) relations); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. 
L. REV. 1 (1990); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3, at 888 (“Fiduciary duties are 
standard-form contractual terms that govern agency relationships.  They allow the 
parties to avoid excessively lengthy and detailed agreements, thereby reducing the 
costs of contracting.”), with Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in 
Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 597 (1997) (“[T]o say that a relationship is 
contractual ‘only begins analysis; it gives direction to further analysis....’”); Melvin 
Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 211 (1995); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close 
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The 
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial 
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Robert Charles Clark, Agency Costs Versus 
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (J. 
Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency 
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Alison Grey 
Anderson, Conflicts of Interests: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978). 
82
information before trading on it.  A shareholder who purchased stock from
an informed insider could not claim fiduciary breach, for the duty owed by
the insider would have been contractually tailored to exclude a disclosure 
duty.361  Thus, authorized PDIT is legally permissible, even if the gravamen 
of classical insider trading is breach of fiduciary duty rather than a feigning 
of fidelity, if fiduciary duties are contractually alterable.  
3. If Even Candid Classical Insider Trading Is 
Forbidden, and Fiduciary Duties Are Not 
Purely Contractual
Under the two legal scenarios considered so far, a corporation could 
authorize price-enhancing, as well as price-decreasing, insider trading.
Under the first legal scenario (i.e., only deceptive trading is prohibited), 
authorized PEIT would be insulated because there could be no deception 
where the seller, in light of the corporation’s ex ante authorization of PEIT, 
had no legitimate expectation that an insider would refrain from buying 
company stock on the basis of material, non-public information.362  Under 
the second legal scenario (i.e., breach of fiduciary duty is the crux of the 
violation, but fiduciary duties are ultimately contractual), the corporation’s 
express authorization of PEIT would effectively tailor insiders’ fiduciary 
duties to exclude any obligation to disclose non-public information before 
trading. Suppose, though, that the true state of the law is that (1) even 
candid insider trading is forbidden, and (2) fiduciary duties are not 
contractually alterable.  Under that legal regime, which is maximally hostile 
to a liberalized insider trading policy and appears to reflect the status quo, 
authorized PEIT would probably be illegal, but authorized PDIT would be 
legally permissible.
First consider why this most restrictive view of the law would permit
authorized PDIT.  It is a basic principle of corporate law that a corporate 
agent’s fiduciary duty is ultimately owed to the corporation itself, not to 
individual shareholders.363 Of course, most agent conduct that might injure 
361
 Of course, a buyer who was not already a shareholder of the insider’s company 
would have no grounds for complaint, for the insider would not be her fiduciary 
(and thus would owe her no disclosure duty).
362 See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
363 See generally CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 260 
(3d ed. 1999) (“Normally, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to 
individual shareholders.”).  See also Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 
F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) (observing that “directors’ duties of loyalty and care 
run to the corporation, not to individual shareholders or even to a majority of the 
shareholders”); Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978) (because 
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an individual shareholder would also threaten some sort of injury to the 
corporation’s business operations and/or financial prospects and would 
therefore be barred by the agent’s fiduciary duty to the corporation.  But 
where an agent’s action might disadvantage an individual shareholder but 
would benefit the corporation as a whole, the agent’s fiduciary duties should 
not preclude him from taking that action.  After all, the agent’s ultimate duty 
of loyalty is to the corporation itself.
With respect to disclosed PDIT, this is the situation an agent confronts:  
The agent’s sale on the basis of negative inside information might injure an 
existing shareholder (assuming, of course, that the purchaser is a current 
shareholder; if not, there’s no way the agent’s action could involve any kind 
of breach of duty).364  The corporation as a whole, though, would actually 
benefit from the agent’s action, for the disclosed PDIT would tend to reduce 
equity overvaluation365 and the costs associated therewith.366  In short, the 
agent faces a situation where an individual shareholder’s interest in candor 
conflicts with the broader interests of the corporation as a whole.  Since the 
agent’s fiduciary duty is ultimately owed to the corporation, not to 
individual shareholders,367 she would breach no duty by furthering the 
fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation, not to individual shareholders, “the 
traditional common law approach has been to permit officers and directors of 
corporations to trade in their corporation’s securities free from liability to other 
traders for failing to disclose inside information”); Schautteet v. Chester State Bank, 
707 F. Supp. 885, 888 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (“Officers and directors owe fiduciary 
duties only to the corporation.”); Bessette v. Bessette, 434 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Mass. 
1982) (providing that fiduciary duty is owed to corporation, not individuals); Myer 
v. Cuevas, 119 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Tex. App. 2003) (“Corporate officers owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporations they serve... [but] corporate officers do not owe 
fiduciary duties to individual shareholders unless a contract or special relationship 
exists between them in addition to the corporate relationship.”); Hoggett v. Brown, 
971 S.W.2d 472, 488 (Tex. App. 1997) (“A director’s fiduciary duty runs only to 
the corporation, not to individual shareholders or even to a majority of the 
shareholders.”); Eric J. Gouvin, Resolving the Subsidiary Director’s Dilemma, 47 
HASTINGS L. J. 287, 296 (1996) (observing that “a director’s fiduciary duty runs to 
the shareholders as a class, and not to individual shareholders in their personal 
capacity”).
364 See supra note 361.
365 See supra notes 260 - 280 and accompanying text (explaining why disclosed 
PDIT would reduce overvaluation).
366 See supra notes 132 - 217 and accompanying text (discussing costs of 
overvalued equity).
367 See supra note 363 and accompanying text.
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corporation’s welfare (and, admittedly, her own financial interests)368 at the 
expense of an individual shareholder’s financial interest.  Thus, even if the 
gravamen of a classical insider trading claim is breach of a non-waiveable 
fiduciary duty, a corporate agent could engage in authorized PDIT.
With respect to insider trading that increases stock price, the situation is 
different. First, in every instance of PEIT, the insider will be dealing with a 
shareholder of the firm itself; with PDIT, by contrast, the insider will 
frequently be dealing with a party who, at the time the trade is executed, 
stands at arms -length from the insider and is owed no fiduciary duties.369
Moreover, while the specific facts and circumstances of any instance of 
PEIT would determine whether corporate damage could result, it is easy to 
envision situations in which such trading would harm the corporation itself, 
as well as the individual shareholder; as noted, PEIT, unlike PDIT, may 
thwart otherwise available corporate opportunities.370  Finally, the “good 
news” upon which the insider engaging in PEIT bases his trade should likely 
belong to the corporation, whereas the “bad news” underlying an instance of 
PDIT should probably belong to the insider himself.371  There is, in other 
words, a more obvious property rights violation (and, thus, breach of 
fiduciary duty) involved in PEIT.  Unlike PDIT, then, PEIT probably cannot 
be authorized if the gravamen of a classical insider trading claim is the
breach of a non-waiveable fiduciary duty.  
CONCLUSION
Substantial equity overvaluation is bad for investors.  Most notably, it 
tends to create significant agency costs that result in the destruction of 
corporate value.  Recognizing this, legislators and regulators have recently 
imposed a host of “top down” measures aimed at preventing such 
368
 The agent’s receipt of trading profits would not, by itself, constitute a breach of 
fiduciary duty.  While agents generally have a duty not to accept “secret profits” 
earned in connection with their work as agents, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 387, they breach no duty (and thus need not disgorge such profits) if 
their principals have consented in advance to their receipt of the profits.  See id. at § 
388.  Here, the express authorization to engage in authorized PDIT would constitute 
consent by the principal that its agents could keep any profits thereby generated.
369 See supra note 361.
370 See supra notes 218 - 227 and accompanying text (explaining why PEIT could 
destroy corporate value by thwarting corporate opportunities, and why PDIT 
generally could not do so).
371 See supra notes 238 - 246 and accompanying text (explaining why property right 
to positive inside information should belong to corporation, whereas right to 
negative inside information should belong to corporate agents).
85
overvaluation.372  Early evidence indicates that this top down approach, 
hastily implemented as a result of what Professor Larry Ribstein has dubbed 
“Sudden Acute Regulatory Syndrome,”373 may create greater costs than 
benefits.374  This Article has therefore proposed a market-oriented, “bottom 
up” approach to preventing or reducing equity overvaluation.  The proposed 
approach would generally permit disclosed insider trading transactions that 
would tend to drive an overvalued stock’s price downward toward actual 
value, while generally banning insider trading that would increase a stock’s
price.  Given the benefits and costs occasioned by the different species of 
insider trading, this asymmetric insider trading regime is likely the policy 
most investors and managers would agree to if they were practically and 
legally able to do so.  Securities regulators should therefore adopt it as the 
default policy for corporations.  
In asking what shareholders and corporate managers would bargain for 
were they practically and legally able to do so, this Article builds on the 
work of scholars who have argued that insider trading policy should be 
handled via contract – i.e., that corporate constituents should be allowed to 
allocate the right to inside information among themselves as they see fit.375
The Article makes two contributions to the work of these so-called 
contractarians. First, by segregating the two types of insider trading (price-
enhancing and price-decreasing) and assessing the investor benefits and 
harms occasioned by each, the Article is able to predict the insider trading 
bargain corporate constituents would likely strike. That is an important 
contribution, for even if a purely contractarian approach were adopted, the 
law must select a default rule that will apply absent any express contractual 
provision, and that rule should reflect majoritarian preferences.376 Second, 
the Article proposes an approach that could be implemented under current 
law.  Most insider trading scholars believe that current legal doctrine would
not sanction a pure contractarian approach under which corporations may 
opt out of the disclose or abstain rule.  By contrast, the asymmetric approach 
advocated herein, which essentially involves opting out of the disclose or 
abstain rule for publicly announced price-decreasing insider trades, could be 
372
 Those top down measures include required internal monitoring, stricter 
regulation of gatekeepers, more stringent rules on insider misconduct, enhanced 
disclosure requirements, and beefed-up regulation of securities analysts.  See
Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, supra note 5, at 6-7.
373 Id. at 7.
374 Id. at 7-20; Romano, supra note 5. 
375 See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 3. 
376
 This Article is thus wholly consistent with the approach of the contractarians; it 
merely seeks to predict the dominant contract and proposes that that hypothetical 
bargain become the default.
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adopted under current law.  The approach therefore represents an 
immediately achievable first step toward the deregulation of insider trading.
